Three Papers in Environmental and Natural Resource Economics by Goodwin, Chris
UC Santa Barbara
UC Santa Barbara Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Title
Three Papers in Environmental and Natural Resource Economics
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6qz9d14b
Author
Goodwin, Chris
Publication Date
2015
 
Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
Santa Barbara
Three Papers in Environmental and
Natural Resource Economics
A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Economics
by
Christopher Colin Goodwin
Committee in Charge:
Professor Olivier Deschenes, Chair
Professor Douglas Steigerwald
Professor Robert Deacon
December 2015
.The Dissertation of
Christopher Colin Goodwin is approved:
Professor Robert Deacon
Professor Douglas Steigerwald
Professor Oliver Deschenes, Committee Chair
December 2015
. .
Three Papers in Environmental and Natural Resource Economics
Copyright c© 2015
by
Christopher Colin Goodwin
iii
VITA OF CHRISTOPHER COLIN GOODWIN
December 2015
EDUCATION
Bachelor of Forestry Science, First Class Honours, University of Canterbury, 2000
Master of Science in Forestry, Virginia Polytechnic & State University, 2002
Master of Arts in Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2008
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2015 (ex-
pected)
iv
Three Papers in Environmental and Natural Resource Economics
Christopher Colin Goodwin
Abstract
The first chapter concerns the eruption of Mount St. Helens in Washington State
on May 18th, 1980 which resulted in a massive and unanticipated particulate air pollu-
tion shock. I use the incidence of the ash cloud fallout across Washington as a natural
experiment to estimate the effect of a particulate shock on birth outcomes and infant
mortality. I find that while there is no statistical effect on infant mortality, there were
statistically fewer low birth weight babies born. The measured effect indicates about 230
fewer babies were born as a result of exposure while in the womb. These results suggest
that about 1 in 10 pregnancies were terminated from the 20th percentile group of the
weight distribution, increasing to almost 1 in 5 in the lowest 5th percentile. The effect is
found to be the strongest in the early stages of pregnancy. Using these findings I estimate
that the cost of a single particulate shock of typical magnitude on a metropolitan area
of median size is $3.7 million. This quasi-experimental treatment is unique since the ash
particulate is bioreactively inert and uncorrelated with other pollution. It clearly identi-
fies the pernicious nature of all particulates, not just particulate categorized by source.
In addition, the discrete timing of the event identifies the most vulnerable window for
suspended particulate shocks on expectant mothers.
In the second chapter, my colleague Daniel Moncayo and I investigate the informa-
tional effect that social comparisons play in household electricity use. We employ a
randomized field experiment to present individuals with a social norm that encourages
them to conserve electricity by comparing their consumption to that of an “energy effi-
v
cient neighbor,” consisting of the average of the 10th percentile of participants’ electricity
consumption. Utilizing smart-meter data, we find households that received our informa-
tional treatment reduced their electricity consumption by an average of 7%, even though
the treatment was private and there was no financial incentive to conserve. We also
discover that conservation gains are largest during the peak morning and evening hours.
The third chapter examines the effect of country-level political stability and invest-
ment security on forestland use. Using cross-section data I find that these measures are
associated with benign outcomes for overall rates of forest area change and roundwood
production. These associations are robust when instrumented for endogeneity, and reveal
stronger impacts than OLS estimates would imply. Two-stage least squares results indi-
cate that a one standard deviation increase in political stability, as currently measured
by the World Bank, increases forest area by 12% over 10 years, and increases roundwood
production by a factor of 10 to 19. Targeting political stability and investment security
may be one of the most effective tools in mitigating carbon emissions through forest
expansion and increasing forest productivity.
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Chapter 1
Air Quality and Birth Outcomes:
The Mount St. Helens Eruption - A
Natural Experiment.
1
Summary
The eruption of Mount St. Helens in Washington State on May 18th, 1980 resulted in
a massive and unanticipated particulate air pollution shock. I use the incidence of the
ash cloud fallout across Washington as a natural experiment to estimate the effect of
a particulate shock on birth outcomes and infant mortality. I find that while there is
no statistical effect on infant mortality, there were statistically fewer low birth weight
babies born. The measured effect indicates about 230 fewer babies were born as a result
of exposure while in the womb. These results suggest that about 1 in 10 pregnancies were
terminated from the 20th percentile group of the weight distribution, increasing to almost
1 in 5 in the lowest 5th percentile. The effect is found to be the strongest in the early
stages of pregnancy. Using these findings I estimate that the cost of a single particulate
shock of typical magnitude on a metropolitan area of median size is $3.7 million. This
quasi-experimental treatment is unique since the ash particulate is bioreactively inert
and uncorrelated with other pollution. It clearly identifies the pernicious nature of all
particulates, not just particulate categorized by source. In addition, the discrete timing
of the event identifies the most vulnerable window for suspended particulate shocks on
expectant mothers.
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1.1 Introduction
Since 1970, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has regulated particulate
air pollution as a criteria pollutant1 for the public health and wellbeing. Particulate pol-
lution2 has been linked in epidemiological studies to increased risks of cardiopulmonary
disease and mortality in humans.3 More importantly, short term particulate shocks
are thought to directly affect mortality (U.S. EPA, 2011). However, there are no large
scale clinical trials of human exposure (in vivo) to particulates4 and the suggestion of
causality is actively questioned. Natural experiments, where the incidence of exposure
is distributed independent of population characteristics, offer a way for researchers to
overcome many of the issues regarding self selection and simultaneity that characterize
epidemiological research.
The ashfall from the May 18th, 1980, eruption of Mount St. Helens constitutes a quasi-
experimental treatment in particulate exposure. Using the universe of birth and death
records from the State of Washington I find two important things. First, there are sta-
tistically fewer babies born in the lower tail of the birth weight distribution within the
nine month timing window after the Mount St. Helens eruption. Second, there is no
statistical evidence of an increase in the infant death rate for infants (children less than
one-year old) exposed either as infants or whilst in utero. This quasi-experimental event
affected about 9000 pregnant women and represents a close ideal to the research design
where air pollution is randomly assigned across mothers and infants, as discussed by
1The EPA is required to set National Ambient Air Quality Standards for six pollutants under the
Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.); these six pollutants are known as criteria pollutants.
2Various particulate pollution categorizations have been promulgated since 1970. Prior to 1987 all
particulates up to around 45 micrometers in diameter were measured as Total Suspended Particulates
(TSP). Between 1987 and 1997 particulates were measured and categorized as PM10 - particulates less
than 10 microns. After 1997, two sets of standards have been in force - one set for fine particulates
called PM2.5 (particulates less than 2.5 microns) and one set for coarse particulates (PM10).
3See Pope (2000) for a review of the more than 150 epidemiological studies.
4U.S. EPA (2009) tabulates 58 small scale and limited controlled human exposure studies. There
are no more than 50 participants in any one study, with most involving 10-15 subjects.
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Chay and Greenstone (2003).
There are number of significant reasons why the Mount St. Helens eruption is a com-
pelling natural experiment in particulate exposure. The eruption was a discrete exoge-
nous shock that sent millions of tons of particulate matter5 across parts of Washington,
Idaho, and Montana. More than 90% of this particulate matter was in the respirable
range (< 10µm diameter) (Baxter et al., 1981) and recorded on air quality monitors as
Total Suspended Particulate (TSP). The city of Yakima, located in eastern Washing-
ton, recorded6 fine particulates (< 2.5µm diameter) in excess of 33,000 µg/m3 - almost
10,000 times the now current 24-hour standard.7 Elevated levels of TSP were recorded at
Yakima for 7 days following the ashfall; this transience is clearly seen in Figure 1.1 against
ambient background readings through time. Furthermore, elevated levels of particulates
were recorded inside homes, schools, commercial establishments, and automobiles in af-
fected areas (Center for Disease Control, 1980c). The diffusion of this particulate matter
through the atmosphere, and the subsequent deposition, created a pattern of particulate
exposure to humans that was independent of demographic or socioeconomic profiles.8
Prior to the eruption, the scale of the Mount St. Helens ashfall was neither expected nor
predicted (Warrick et al., 1981). During the event, official emergency warnings ambigu-
ously reported the extent of and the recommended response to the ash fallout.9 After
the event there were no coordinated public health messages on the effects of exposure
5Green et al. (1982) estimates the eruption ejected about 4km3 of material into the atmosphere.
6Low flow rate, less than 24 hour sample.
7To meet current attainment standards the 98th percentile of 24-hour PM2.5 readings must not
exceed 35µg/m3 averaged over three years.
8Actual individual exposure could be correlated with income or other social-economic characteristics,
this possibility is discussed in Section 6.
9The first teletype message issued by the Washington State Department of Emergency Services was
at 10:15am, 30 minutes after the ash cloud had passed over the city of Yakima, and about 1.5 hours
after the eruption itself. This teletype simply stated, “precautionary measures are encouraged”. The
next emergency message was not issued until after 1:30pm - the ash had already passed into Montana.
This teletype instructed residents to stay indoors.
4
to the ash fallout in part because the effects were not known.10 In fact, the exposure to
the particulate was thought to be relatively benign,11 though there was little scientific
evidence to support that assumption at the time.
Using the incidence of the ashfall as a quasi-experimental treatment for a particulate
shock is relevant for three reasons. First, being uncorrelated with other types of air pol-
lution it is unique in identifying the effects of a particulate shock.12 Second, the discrete
timing sheds light onto the prenatal effects of pollution. Third, it clearly identifies the
importance of particle toxicity for a pollutant that is only determined by particle size.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes back-
ground information on the connection between air pollution and health effects generally,
as well as what is known about the specific health impacts of the Mount St. Helens
eruption. Sections 3 and 4 present the data and methods respectively and describes the
covariates in comparison between the affected and non-affected areas. Section 5 presents
the main results and outlines robustness test outcomes. Section 6 discusses the validity
of the natural experiment and details conclusions.
10The Mount St. Helens eruption spurred much of the subsequent research into the effects of volcanic
ash on human health Horwell and Baxter (2006).
11The first hand account of Russel Ephraim, M.D., a Centers for Disease Control emergency team
leader, reported a few days after the eruption that children treated the ash as a play thing such as sand
or fresh snow by making wetted ash-balls to throw, or riding bicycles and tricycles through ash piles
and down ashen streets to make ash plumes. Adults also seemed ambivalent to any potential risk since
masks were given out but most people did not wear any kind of protection, even when actively cleaning
or clearing ash (Center for Disease Control, 1980e).
12Criteria air pollutant levels recorded by the EPA during this period remained at normal ambient
levels.
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1.2 Background
1.2.1 Health effects of air pollution
The EPA regulates six pollutants under the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
framework. The primary impact of these pollutants occurs through inhalation.13 Each
has a different patho-physiological pathway14 but all generally lead to increased morbid-
ity and mortality. In the case of particulates, this morbidity and mortality risk is a result
of lung irritation, a generalized stress response, erratic heart rate, and dis-function of the
cells lining the lungs. The causal effects have been inferred based on a now, very large
number of studies that fall into one of several types.15 Among these, epidemiological
investigations are the most numerous and generally show a positive correlation between
exposure levels and medical visits, shorter life expectancy, and mortality. However epi-
demiological studies suffer from identification issues that range from the confounding
effects of weather, co-pollutant associations, seasonality, lifetime exposure, self selection,
and concerns regarding harvesting16 and/or life-shortening (Pope, 2000).
Considering the limitations of epidemiological studies, many researchers pursue empiri-
cal studies with clearer identification strategies. These strategies generally try to exploit
variation induced by an argued exogenous event to overcome self-selection concerns. For
example, Pope (1989) uses temporal variation in Utah TSP levels induced by a brief
steel mill closure that resulted from a labor dispute. He finds respiratory related hospital
admissions were significantly lower when the mill was closed. While Chay, Dobkin, and
13The EPA also regulates these six pollutants under secondary criteria for public welfare effects such
as decreased visibility and damage to crops, livestock, vegetation, and buildings.
14Pathways and physiological effects of each criteria pollutant are briefly outlined in Table A1.1 in
the Appendix.
15There are three broad types of study that constitute the body of evidence for causality used by the
EPA. These are epidemiological studies, in vitro trials, and in vivo experiments.
16Harvesting anthropomorphically refers to Death metaphorically reaping those who are already sick
or near the point of dying who might otherwise have died of some other factor in short order.
6
Greenstone (2003) use county level variation in TSP induced by the 1970 Clean Air Act
Amendments (CAAA). They find that the regulation induced pollution reduction is not
statistically associated with a reduction in adult mortality.
Natural experiments are not, in and of themselves, sufficient to overcome all the endo-
geneity issues listed above. For this reason researchers often focus on the infant health
impacts of natural experiments to mitigate harvesting and life-time exposure concerns.
During the temporary Utah steel mill closure mentioned above, Parker, Mendola, and
Woodruff (2008) find fewer pre-term babies were born. Using the 1970 CAAA discon-
tinuity, Sanders and Stoecker (2011) find that male baby births17 drop by 3.1% as a
result of a one standard deviation increase in pollution levels; using the same disconti-
nuity, Isen, Rossin-Slater, and Walker (2014) find that a 10 point drop in TSP exposure
during infancy results in a 1% increase in annual wage. Chay and Greenstone (2003)
utilize county level variation in TSP levels from a short term recession in the early 1980’s
to leverage identification. They find a 1% reduction in annual TSP results in a 0.35%
decline in infant mortality. Further, Sanders (2011) examines education outcomes for
students born during that same time frame and finds a one standard deviation decrease
in TSP level in the birth year is associated with an almost 2% increase in high school
standardized test scores.
These studies focus their attention on infants who have arguably much lower lifetime
exposure to pollutants and perhaps lower concerns about harvesting than those that
estimate particulate effects on adults. However, endogeneity concerns still remain with
regard to self-selection, and interactions with co-pollutants, weather, and seasonality. An
17Based on the hypothesized Trivers-Willard effect Sanders and Stoecker estimate between 21,000
and 134,000 fetal deaths were prevented by the CAAA. The Trivers-Willard effect is the hypothesis that
mammalian females in poor maternal condition tend to produce more females than males, while those
in good maternal health tend to produce more males (Trivers and Willard, 1973).
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identification strategy that relies on induced variation over longer time frames and eco-
nomic factors factors can result in differential impacts and effects by population groups
on migration, unemployment, loss of insurance or access to healthcare, economic stress,
etc. Since it is not clear how to control for these confounding factors, natural experiments
or policy induced changes in pollutant levels are likely to still suffer from endogeneity.
With regard to the ashfall that affected eastern Washington, there is no sense that res-
idents chose to live in that part of the state as a trade-off between the likelihood of an
eruption induced particulate shock and their income, or any other factor. As discussed
below, the ashfall was a discrete random event that contained no other co-pollutants and
was effectively exogenous.
Quasi-experimental settings offer clear advantages over epidemiological approaches. Re-
searchers have also used this type of identification strategy to investigate the effects of
air pollutants other than particulates. Notably, Moretti and Neidell (2011) use the inci-
dence of ship traffic at the Ports of Los Angles as an instrument to measure the effect of
ozone on area hospitalizations. Almond, Edlund, and Palme (2009) and Black, Butikofer,
Devereux, and Salvanes (2013) use the, arguably exogenous, incidence of radioactive fall-
out over Scandinavian countries in the 1980’s and 1960’s respectively, to estimate the
effect of prenatal radiation exposure on birth and educational outcomes. Currie, Nei-
dell, and Schmieder (2009) investigate the effects of carbon monoxide on infant health
by using variation in pollution exposure around birth between siblings. While Currie
and Walker (2011) use difference-in-differences estimation to measure the effect of auto
emissions on infant health before and after the installation of automated toll road equip-
ment. Jayachandran (2009) exploits the incidence and timing of smoke across Indonesia
from massive wildfires to estimate the effect on prenatal mortality, finding that exposure
during the later end of pregnancy is the most damaging. Recently, Tanaka (2010) and
Luechinger (2011) use air pollution policy changes in China and Germany respectively,
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to estimate the effect of airborne sulfur oxides on infant health. In all of these natural
experiment or discontinuity settings however, co-pollutants still remain a relevant issue
(among others).
Despite strong identification concerns about epidemiological studies of air pollution they
inform the periodic EPA NAAQS review process.18 With regard to particulate matter
shocks, numerous, though not all, public health researchers find associations between
spikes in particulate mater and human health impacts.19 As a body of evidence, the
EPA has determined causality between fine particulate shocks and cardiovascular effects,
along with human mortality (U.S. EPA, 2009). However, current research is inconclusive
on the relative toxicity of the different components and sources of fine particulate matter
(U.S. EPA, 2011). Furthermore, the EPA, in categorically reviewing the epidemiologi-
cal literature on the effects of particulates on infant mortality, concludes that there is
no consistent window of exposure (U.S. EPA, 2009). Finally, there are no known stud-
ies on spikes in particulate matter levels and infant health in a quasi-experimental setting.
There are a few studies that examine the effects of average particulate exposure on fetal
death and miscarriage.20 Sanders and Stoecker (2011) is mentioned above. Mohallem
et al. (2005) show that mice exposed to air pollution from Sao Paulo, Brazil (pollution
that includes particulates) have fewer live births and more implantation failures.21 While
Pereira et al. (1998) find no association between Sao Paulo air pollution and human fetal
deaths. Kim et al. (2007) find that stillbirths were positively associated with particulate
levels in the third trimester of pregnancy for women in Seoul, South Korea. However,
18Section 109(d)(1) of 42 U.S.C. 7409 requires the EPA to review criteria pollutants and NAAQS
every five years.
19See U.S. EPA (2009) for an extensive literature review.
20Fetal death (stillbirth) is the death of the fetus after 20 weeks of gestational age. Prior to 20 weeks,
in-uterine death is categorized as miscarriage.
21Mohallem et al. (2005) did not find an effect on sex ratio vis-a-vis the Trivers-Willard effect.
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Hwang, Lee, and Jaakkola (2011) find that first trimester exposure to particulate pol-
lution is associated with an increase in stillbirths in Taiwan. Even so there remains a
gap between our knowledge of transient particulate shocks and their effect on pregnancy
outcomes.
The utilization of the Mount St. Helens eruption ashfall as a natural experiment in par-
ticulate exposure is clearly a powerful identification strategy that overcomes many signif-
icant problems in previous studies. It also fills a void in our understanding of the effect
of a single particulate shock on infant/fetal health. The ashfall contains only particulate
matter, there are no other co-pollutants as recorded by air quality monitors and investi-
gated by ashfall composition assays. The ash is relatively inert – it establishes a baseline
effect for all particulate matter regardless of source.22 The ashfall is a discrete event,
clearly discernible against the background of particulates and allows the determination
of when particulate matter exposure is most pernicious to infant/fetal health. Further-
more, the ashfall affected a large population of pregnant women and infants at the same
time.
1.2.2 Health effects of Mount St. Helens ash
The Centers for Disease Control confirmed 31 Mount St. Helens eruption-associated
deaths as of August 22, 1980 (Center for Disease Control, 1980d). Despite TSP levels
in excess 30,000 micro-grams per cubic meter23 observed in some of the most heavily
affected areas outside the blast and tree destruction area (Center for Disease Control,
22Constituent sources of particulate matter vary greatly by time and location. Generally most par-
ticulates originate from fossil fuel combustion and fugitive dust (U.S. EPA, 2009).
23The EPA 24hr standard for TSP at that time was 260µg/m3, with thresholds for the designations
alert, warning, emergency, and significant harm at levels of 375, 625, 875, and 1000µg/m3 respectively
(Center for Disease Control, 1980e)
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1980e), there were no deaths associated with exposure to ash particulates.24 In the ash-
fall area there was, however, a significant spike in the number of hospital emergency
room visits following the eruption with patients complaining of sore throats, shortness
of breath, eye irritation, and emphysema like symptoms. But there was no increase in
the number of patients diagnosed with chronic or acute bronchitis (Center for Disease
Control, 1980a). Not long after the eruption the CDC concluded that there was no initial
evidence of severe respiratory illness (Center for Disease Control, 1980b).
Many studies investigate or document the effects of the Mount St. Helens ash on humans,
but none investigate the health effect on infants and birth outcomes. A number of these
focus on the acute effects of ash exposure through hospital and emergency room records
(Baxter et al., 1981; Nania and Bruya, 1982; Merchant et al., 1982; Baxter et al., 1983).
Through surveys administered to two small rural towns (one in the affected area and
one not) Shore, Tatum, and Vollmer (1986) report that the eruption caused some higher
levels of mental anxiety and a possible elevation in risk for mental health issues. Adams
and Adams (1984) find some evidence to conclude there was an increase in alcoholism
and domestic abuse in a different rural town. Lines of investigation also examine the clin-
ical effects of the ash on population subgroups, specifically children and loggers. These
find short-term reduced lung function in some cases and no effects in others (Bernstein
et al., 1981; Johnson, Loftsgaarden, and Gideon, 1982; Buist et al., 1983, 1986). Fruan-
felder et al. (1983) examine the ocular effects of ash on loggers up to 18 months after the
eruption, finding that the particulates were “well tolerated”. Generally, these studies are
small in scope and limited in the number of observations available for inference. Only one
study related to Mt St. Helens ash has used a panel data set; Norton and Gunter (1999)
investigate the relationship between respiratory disease and particulate matter in Idaho.
24Postmortem examination for 23 of the Mount St. Helen’s deaths showed the cause to be asphyxiation
from the inhalation of ash (Center for Disease Control, 1980a). All deaths were all immediately proximal
to the volcanic blast.
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Sampled particulate matter contained about 60% Mount St Helens ash. The authors
do not find any correlation between particulate matter levels and respiratory disease in
either the general population or in specific groups, such as farmers, typically exposed
to higher levels of dust. Using the set of births in Washington, my paper is the first to
investigate whether the ashfall had an effect on infants. It is also the first to reveal the
evidence of fetal mortality as a result of exposure in the womb.
Other lines of research study the effect of Mount St Helens ash through in-vitro, and
in some cases in-vivo clinical trials25 (Fruchter et al., 1980; Beck, Brian, and Bohan-
non, 1981; Green et al., 1981, 1982; Craighead et al., 1983; Vallyathan et al., 1983a,b;
McLemore et al., 1984). They show that exposure carries some risk of a fibrogenic ef-
fect and and a potential for pneumoconiosis for heavily exposed individuals. In general,
however, the ash is decribed as non-toxic and similar in clinical effect to aluminum oxide
dust which is considered relatively inert compared to other constituents typically found in
particulate air pollution. That the ash, which constitutes the massive particulate shock,
is considered bioreactively inert is a clear advantage in my quasi-experimental design.
From this fact I am able to identify a lower bound on the effect of particulate shocks
in general, other particulate constituents from combustion being more bioreactive. As
found by the clinical studies of the ash above, my design also has the advantage of being
unencumbered by other types of air pollution. Therefore, my research not only uncovers
effects of the ashfall that have gone unnoticed, it also is also the first to identify effects
of a single particulate shock.
25In-vitro refers to laboratory testing on isolated living cells, in-vivo refers to testing on whole living
organisms, i.e animals.
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1.3 Data
Data for this study comes from publicly available birth and mortality records collated by
year by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.26 The birth and death records
for the State of Washington were extracted from these files for January 1973 through
December 1988.27 The extracted birth data constitutes the micro-level dataset of indi-
vidual births used in the birth weight analyses. To create a panel of county-month infant
mortality rates I aggregate birth and mortality data into month and county of residence
cells, after deaths due to external causes are filtered out.
To determine treated and untreated observations I use the ashfall isomass contour lines
from Sarna-Wojcicki et al. (1981).28. The extent of the ashfall (above trace amounts)
across Washington state is presented in Figure 1.2, and shows the 8 counties designated
as treated and 15 non-treated counties. My research design confines the investigation
into the effect of the ashfall TSP shock to a binary treatment and control setting. While
it is recognized that there is a heterogeneous distribution of TSP exposure, due to lim-
itations in the publicly available data, it is not possible to identify exposure at a finer
level than the county. Furthermore county level exposure is not directly determinable.
Even though the work of Sarna-Wojcicki et al. (1981) describes the thickness of the ash
deposited across Washington, is it not entirely clear how this relates to particulate levels
in any given county. The historical EPA TSP monitor data is only available at the av-
erage weekly level and there were only two monitors located in the affected area at the
time of the eruption. In addition the thickness of the ashfall is not a sufficient condition
26Data available at <http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data access/Vitalstatsonline.htm>
27The universe of birth records for Washington State are only available from 1978, before 1978 only
a 50% sample is available – each of these records is doubled in the dataset used. After 1988 the date of
birth in the natality files, and the date of death in the mortality files is not available.
28Counties on the margin of the ashfall and those counties that received some ashfall but where the
population largely resides outside the affected area were not included in the primary analysis. These
marginal counties are included later as a robustness check.
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to estimate the exposure levels. The winnowing effect time and distance from the erup-
tion, as well as idiosyncratic atmospheric mixing patterns preclude the use proximity or
similar surrogates for county level exposure.
Given the prevailing winds on the day of the eruption were westerly, the eight treated
counties lie in eastern Washington, a region that is primarily agricultural and dry. The
fifteen non-treated counties are also generally rural and, for the most part, west of the
Cascade ranges along the Pacific coast. Pre-eruption descriptive statistic comparisons
between treated and non-treated counties are presented in Table 1.1. Between 1978 and
1979 there was no statistical mean difference between the percentage of males born, per-
centage white mothers, and percentage of babies born with no prenatal care. Though
the other cofactor means are very similar, there are some statistical differences. About 2
per 100 fewer babies born received early prenatal care in the treated counties on average.
Gestation length is significantly shorter in the treated counties by 1.5 days, mother’s
are younger by 3 months on average, and about 1 per 100 more births are to teenage
mothers. About 3 per 100 more births on average are to immigrant mothers, while 2 per
100 more births are to non-married women, but 2 per 100 more births are delivered in
hospitals in the treated counties as a whole.
Although I utilize a binary treatment for the ashfall TSP shock, it is relevant to compare
the TSP levels for each of the two groups of counties before the eruption. Historical
air quality data, available from the US EPA Air Quality System,29 reveals a statistically
significant mean difference in the levels of TSP. Between 1978-1979 the TSP levels appear
to be parallel and trending slightly upward. Treated counties are, on average, 20µg/m3
higher than the non-treated group as shown in Figure 1.3. Using the point estimate
results from Chay & Greenstone (2003), this would imply an estimated 1 per 1000 dif-
29EPA AQS data accessed from<http://www.epa.gov/ttnairs1/airsaqs/archived%20data/index.htm>
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ference in the infant mortality rate, and a 6 gram difference in birth weight, between the
two groups of counties.
Through the 1970’s infant mortality was typically higher in the treated counties. On
average, the annual difference was around 2.6 more infant deaths per 1000 births in the
treated counties. Figure 1.4 plots the annual infant mortality rates during the 1970’s
between the two groups of counties, and generally shows a downward parallel trend.
Comparing the number of infant deaths for May, June, and July, 1980 with the same
period the previous year, there were 13 more infant deaths in the treated counties, com-
pared to 17 more infant deaths for the non-treated counties. As shown in Table 1.2,
taking into account the differential number of live births, the treated group infant mor-
tality rate increased by 3.7 while the non-treated group rate only rose by 2.8, with a
seeming impact of an extra 0.85 deaths per 1000 births as a result of the ash fall.
While basic comparisons of the data show that infant mortality apparently increased
slightly over the same 3-month period from the previous year, mean infant birth weight
was also higher. Table 1.3 presents the mean infant birth weight for the treated and
non-treated counties for May, June, and July, 1980 and the same three months one year
earlier. Average infant birth weight increased by 31 grams for babies in the treated
group over those three months relative to the non-treated infants.30 This outcome seems
counter intuitive, but, as discussed in the next section, this comparison of birth weights
does not take into account an upward bias by the failure to account for any increase in
fetal deaths and miscarriages of at-risk fetuses.
30The mean difference is significant at the 10% level using a one-way ANOVA.
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1.4 Methods
In order to address the issues of harvesting and lifetime exposure I focus my analysis on
infant outcomes. Though infants are not a perfect group that has neither been exposed to
pollution prior to the ashfall nor a likelihood of imminent death due to prior conditions,
they are at least considered to be a group of minimal concern relative to older populations.
I hypothesize that air pollution, and the ashfall particulate shock specifically, may affect
infants prior to birth, and infant health after birth. Given the paucity of available infant
health data I limit my analysis of these hypotheses to measuring the effect of the ashfall
on infant birth weight and infant mortality.
1.4.1 Infant birth weight
As a measure of pre-natal infant health, birth weight is a common proxy variable in many
studies, including those that investigate the effect of pollution on infant health.31 Using
a baseline difference in differences approach to estimate the average treatment affect of
exposure to the ashfall TSP shock whilst in utero, the following log-linear model is esti-
mated:
ln(birth wgt)i = α0 + α1I(ash county)i + α2I(in utero)i
(1)
+α3[I(ashcounty)i × I(in utero)i] + i
where i indexes the individual. I(ash county)i is an indicator variable that takes on the
value 1 if the county where the individual is born is designated as ‘treated’ (the county
received more than a trace amount of ashfall, see Figure:1.2) and a value of 0 otherwise,
while I(in utero)i is also an binary variable that takes on the value 1 if the baby was
in utero on the date of the eruption (May 18th, 1980) and 0 otherwise. The interaction
31For example see Chay and Greenstone (2003); Almond, Chay, and Lee (2005); Almond, Edlund,
and Palme (2009); Currie, Neidell, and Schmieder (2009).
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between the two indicator variables is the regressor of interest with α3 the estimator for
the average treatment effect across all babies exposed in utero. Given the hypothesized
deleterious effect of TSP exposure on fetal health α3 is assumed to be negative. In the
case of complete random assignment of the treatment, model (1) would be sufficient for
modeling an unbiased and consistent average treatment effect. However, since the treat-
ment was not randomly assigned but imposed through a quasi-experimental natural event
I add successive controls to Model (1). Models (2), (3), and (4), additively include rele-
vant birth cofactors, month and year fixed effects, and county fixed effects respectively.
Birth cofactors include gestation length and mothers age along with dummy variables for
early prenatal care, no prenatal care, birth at a hospital, whether the baby is male, one
of a multiple birth, born prematurely, and/or white, and whether the mother is married,
an immigrant, and/or less than 18 years old.32
The ashfall TSP shock may affect infant birth weight depending on when the infant
was exposed during the fetal development cycle. In order to investigate this I partition
out the in utero indicator variable in Model (1) by trimester33 in the following way:
ln(birth wgt)i = β0 + β1I(ash county)i +
4∑
j=2
βjI(in utero trimesterj−1)i
(5)
+
7∑
k=5
βkI(in utero trimester(k−4))i × I(ashcounty)i + i
where the subscripts on trimester indicate the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd, trimester of pregnancy.
There are now three indicator variables that describe whether or not the baby was in
utero during a given trimester at the time of the eruption. The three difference in differ-
ences interactions are now the regressors of interest. Model (5) is further augmented by
32Gestation length and male births may themselves be outcome variables. The effect of the ashfall
on these two variables is mentioned in the Results section.
33While embryonic and fetal development is a continuous process it is generally divided into three
time periods representing embryogenesis, the beginning of the fetal period, and the beginning of the
perinatal period.
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including the successive controls previously mentioned and constitute regression models
(6), (7), and (8).
A critical limitation of the models described above is the assumption that, conditional
on fetal health, the likelihood of miscarriage and fetal death is unaffected by exposure
to the TSP shock. This is to say that the error term (with respect to fetal health) is
uncorrelated with exposure while in the womb and that there is no omitted variable
bias. However, birth weight is the primary proxy for the health of the baby during fetal
development. Larger fetuses are generally more healthy, have heavier birth weights, and
are less likely to be terminated than their smaller counterparts. Failure to account for
the possibility that less healthy fetuses exposed to the TSP shock may be at a higher
risk of termination would result in an upward bias in the average treatment effect as
measured by birth weight. It would be the more healthy babies, and thus the heavier
babies, that are more likely to be born and have their birth weights recorded. Since
there is no available data on fetal health other than the proxy ’birth weight’ it is not
possible to model birth weight conditional on fetal health. Given this limitation is not
directly surmountable I model the effect of the TSP shock on the distribution of birth
weight outcomes. I estimate the following linear probability model to characterize the
distribution of birth weight:
I(birth wgti < a) = α1I(ash county)i + α2I(in utero)i
(9)+α3I(ashcounty)i × I(in utero)i
+xiγ + Ti + Ci + i
where a, in grams, is the set {2000, 2500, 3000, 3500, 4000, 4500} which roughly corre-
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sponds to the 2.5th, 5th, 20th, 50th, 85th, and 97.5th percentiles respectively.34 Also, x,
T , and C designate birth cofactor variables, month and year fixed effects, and county of
birth fixed effects respectively.
Model (9) estimates the likelihood a baby is born below a particular partition of the
birth weight distribution - the regressor of interest is again the difference in differences
intersection of being born in a county that was affected by the ashfall and being in utero
at any point during the nine months of fetal development at the time of the eruption. As
above, I also separate out the in utero indicator based on trimester of fetal development.
The linear probability model now splits out the effect of the TSP shock on the distribu-
tion of birth weight across each of the three trimesters as specified by:
I(birth wgti < a) = β1I(ash county)i +
4∑
j=2
βjI(in utero trimesterj−1)i
(10)
+
7∑
k=5
βkI(in utero trimesterk−4)i × I(ashcounty)i
+xiγ + Ti + Ci + i
where the set a is defined as above, and other variables as previously defined.
1.4.2 Infant mortality
In order to model the effect of the ashfall TSP shock on infant mortality I begin by
defining the infant mortality rate in the standard fashion. Specifically, infant mortality
rate is the number of infant deaths35 in a given time period divided by the number of
34According to pediatric lexicon, a birth weight of 2500 grams or less is categorized as “low birth
weight”.
35Infants are categorized as children less than one year old. Intentional or accidental deaths are not
included in this statistic.
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births in that same period. Using a difference in differences model I estimate:
inf mortit = α0 + α1I(ash county)i + α2I(ash timing)t
(11)
+α3I(ashcounty)i × I(ash timing)t + it
where i indexes county and t indexes month. I(ash timing)t is an indicator variable that
takes the value of 1 for every county-month observation up to one year after the May
eruption. A one year window of effect is chosen arbitrarily so as to encompass observa-
tions that not only include the effect on babies already born at the time of the eruption
and who may succumb to the deleterious effects of the TSP shock over time, but also
those babies that were treated in utero who were yet to be born up to 9 months later.36
The coefficient on the interaction between the ash-county and the ash-timing indicators
capture the average treatment effect of exposure to the ashfall TSP shock. Given the
quasi-experimental setup I additively expand Model (11) to include controls for relevant
grouped birth statistics - Model (12), month and year fixed effects - Model (13), and
county fixed effects - Model (14). The grouped birth statistics include the percentage of
births that are white, male, born in a hospital, a multiple birth, born premature, born
to married parents, born to an immigrant mother, born to a teenage mother, had no
prenatal care, and had early prenatal care.
Infant mortality risk can be characterized by a steep decay function as the child lives
longer. Unconditionally, babies less than one month old are at a much higher risk of
death than those close to one year old. Considering that the death of infants who are
older than one month may be idiosyncratic, I adjust the numerator of the infant mor-
tality rate to include only those infants who die that are less than one month old. I
thus re-estimate the four models above as Models (15) through (18) with the adjusted
36Adjustment of the timing window results are discussed later in the paper.
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mortality rate regressand to reduce the noise in the data.
A significant drawback in using the conventional measure of infant mortality above is,
at worst, an implicit assumption that the effect of the TSP shock is homogeneous for
infants of any age, and at best, it attenuates the hypothesized effect. Some infants in the
numerator of the infant mortality statistic were exposed while in the womb and others
exposed after they were born - the effect could be different depending on when and how
the infant was exposed. To address this issue I construct the cohort infant mortality rate
- a statistic that divides the number of babies born in a given month that subsequently
die by the total number of babies born in that same month. To be clear, the infant deaths
counted in each cohort rate observation share a common month of birth, where as in the
standard mortality statistic they share a common month of death. The birth cohort
mortality rate allows me to parse out the effect of the TSP shock on infants already
born and on those that were in utero. I arbitrarily split out the babies born before the
eruption into two groups – those born up to 3 months before the eruption and those born
between 3 and 6 months before. The mortality cohort rate for babies that were in utero
during the ashfall are separated out into trimester groups. I then estimate the difference
in differences models (19) through (22) as such, which include successively more controls
as above.
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1.5 Results
1.5.1 Infant birth weight
Using micro data of births from Jan 1st, 1973 through Feb 18th, 1981, Table 1.4 presents
the estimation results of Models (1) through (4). Recall these models estimate the basic
difference in differences estimates for the effect of the ashfall TSP shock on mean infant
birth weight in logs. In Model (1) the interaction between treated counties and those
infants in the womb at the time of the ashfall is highly significant, suggesting that in-
fant birth weight was on average about 9 percent greater than those babies not treated.
Though this result is counter intuitive, the effect size diminishes once covariates are added
in Models (2) though (4) and it is no longer significant.37
Per models (5) through (8), the results when the in utero timing window is split out into
trimesters are presented in Table 1.5. In model (5) the basic difference in differences esti-
mate between treated and non-treated infants at the 95% level seems to indicate infants
treated during their 1st or 3rd trimesters are on average heavier by around 10 percent.38
However, once controls are included in the regression, the mean birth weight difference
in the 1st and 3rd trimester effect falls to about 8 percent and are significant only at
the 10% level. The point estimates for the 2nd trimester effect in these models is not
significant. These counterintuitive and slightly ambiguous results are cleared up in the
results for Model (9) below.
The distributional effects of the TSP shock, Model (9), are reported in Table 1.6. These
results show that babies that were in utero at the time of the eruption in the group of
37There is no statistically significant effect of the ashfall in these models when gestational length and
percent male babies are used as regressands.
38The respective point estimates for Models (1) though (4) are a weighted average of the results
partitioned by trimester in Models (5) though (8).
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counties that experienced the ashfall are statistically under represented in the lower tail
of the distribution. This accounts for the counter intuitive mean result found in Model
(8). The effect is particularly strong and precisely estimated in the group that is less
than 3000 grams at birth, a weight corresponding to about the first quintile. There is an
estimated 2.45 percentage point decrease in the likelihood that a given baby is born in
the 1st quintile as a result of exposure to the TSP shock while in utero.
The results of Model (9) also show the TSP effect on the distribution of birth weights
did not apparently affect the median and upper ranges where there is an increasingly
precise estimated effect around zero. One explanation for this result is that there was
not a distributional right shift as is perhaps ambiguously implied by the results of Mod-
els (1) and (5)-(8), but that babies who would normally “fill out” the lower range of the
birth weight distribution are missing, thus making it appear that the mean birth weight
baby was born heavier, when in fact this is not the case. This post-ashfall pinching of
the distribution as seen in Figure 1.5.39 Given that during this period there were 9,055
babies born in the treated counties - 1,613 of which were born into the less than 3000
gram segment, the point estimate for babies less than 3000 grams would imply there are
227, or about 1 in 8 babies are missing from the bottom quintile.40 Within the bounds
of a 95% confidence interval, the accuracy of this estimate varies in effect from between
161 to 295 babies. Using the point estimate for babies less than 2000 grams the effect is
larger, about 1 in 6 babies appear to be missing from this weight group.41
39The kernel density graph for the treated counties could also be seen as a post-eruption right shift
in the distribution, but careful inspection reveals the density distortion between 2500 and 3000 grams,
where there is no such distortion on the right side of the density. Furthermore, a symmetric right shift
is not supported by the results of Models (9) and (10).
40The number of missing births is calculated by inflating the total number of births in the treated
counties during this period by the reciprocal of 1 plus the point estimate. The proportion of missing births
in the weight segment is simply the estimated number of missing babies divided by the total number of
babies in the weight group (actual number plus the estimated number missing) expressed as a ratio.
41Though the point estimate is smaller for this weight group there are also fewer babies born into
this group. The net effect, on balance, is larger.
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The results of the estimation for Model (10), where the in utero indicator is split out
into trimesters for the linear probability model, are presented in Table 1.7. These results
further refine the distributional findings above. Babies exposed to the TSP shock while
in utero during their 1st trimester were significantly less likely to be born in the 20th
percentile. The magnitude of this effect diminishes with the age of the fetus and strongly
suggests that the effect of the TSP shock is more deleterious on younger fetuses. This
pattern of effect is mirrored in the point estimates for the low birth weight category
(babies less than 2500 grams). As above, the point estimates at the median and in the
higher percentiles of the distribution show no change in likelihood that babies were born
with heavier birth weights. From these results I find no evidence to suggest a mean shift
in the distribution of birth weight, but a pattern consistent with the hypothesis that
fewer babies were born in the lower tails of the birth weight distribution.
My finding that the TSP shock is most pronounced during the first trimester and for
those fetuses that would have filled out the lower distribution of birth weight is largely
in line with teratogenic principles (Wilson and Fraser, 1977). Focusing on the estimated
effect of the TSP shock on babies in utero during their first trimester; it is 3.21% less
likely that a baby is born in the 20th percentile as a result of exposure. This result
implies there were 94 fewer babies born in the lowest birth weight quintile and represents
an attrition of 1 in 6.25 babies. The strength of the TSP shock increases for the 5th
percentile; the point estimate implies that almost 1 in 4 babies who were exposed in the
first trimester are missing.
In the spirit of Granger (1969) and Autor (2003) I expand the births micro-dataset to
include births for the treated and non-treated counties up to Dec 31, 1998,42 and employ
42This is the last date for which individual birth date data is publicly available.
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a series of leads and lags on the difference in differences variables for Models (9) and
(10). In this manner I estimate a series of falsification tests on the data, forward and
backward through time, as if the ashfall happened in different 9-month periods, in the
case of Model (9), and 3-month intervals, in the case of Model (10). From Model (9),
the estimated effect of the TSP shock from Table 1.6 is dramatically seen at t=0 relative
to the time periods before and after, on the less-than-3000 gram birth weight group in
Figure 1.6. These results show that there appears to be no discernible affect of the ashfall
on birth weight before the eruption, as well as after the 9-month window following the
eruption. In other words there seems to be no effect on mothers who gave birth right
before the eruption nor on those who conceived shortly afterwards either. The leads and
lags also reveal the stability of the median (3500 grams) and higher percentiles (4000
and 4500 grams) to the TSP shock when the timing of effect is measured in the 9 month
in utero window. Figure 1.7 displays the estimated effect of the TSP shock on the birth
weight distribution using a series of 3-month leads and lags. This mimics Model (10) for
the expanded micro-dataset. Similar to the results found for Model (9), the leads and
lags reveal the stability of the median and higher percentiles. Also as found, there is a
dramatic decrease in the likelihood that a baby is born in the 3000 gram or less range
during the actual window of exposure. The figure also shows the relative strength of the
effect for babies exposed in their first trimester, an effect that is lower for babies in their
2nd and 3rd trimester of fetal development.
The addition of county-specific time trends attenuates the point estimates of Models (9)
and (10) but the basic result remains.43 This attenuation is the largest in model (9) where
the point estimate in the < 3000 gram segment is reduced by almost one-half, but it re-
mains strongly significant. Though the 95% confidence interval of the baseline Model
43Regression results with the addition of county-specific time trends for Models (9) and (10) are
reported in the Appendix in Table A1.2 and Table A1.3 respectively.
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(9) < 3000 gram estimate covers the point estimate when county-specific time trends
are employed, this result could indicate dynamic effects which are not easily captured
in my difference-in-differences estimator. Potential dynamic effects are discussed in the
next section. Adding county-specific time trends does not substantially alter the results
above when I expand the dataset to employ leads and lags. Neither does replacing year
and month indicators with year×month dummies. Similarly, re-estimating the models
using the excluded counties that received a trace amount of ashfall or were marginally
contiguous to the ashfall area (see Figure 1.2) does not appreciably alter the basic results.
Another consideration is lumpiness in the birth weight data. Weight at birth was typ-
ically measured in integer ounces and, as such, results in a distribution of mass points
over the range of birth weight (in grams). This kind of mass point distribution can
lead to estimation troubles when discrete regressors are used (see Almond et al. (2010);
Barreca et al. (2010); Barreca, Lindo, and Waddell (2011); Barreca et al. (2011)). For
this reason I check the robustness of the Model (9) results by two methods: I employ a
quasi-Monte-Carlo technique detailed below, I also run the linear probability model using
1-gram increments of the difference-in-differences estimator. As expected, using the latter
method results in some stair stepping estimates that reflect the nature of the mass points
across integer ounce measurements. Despite this sensitivity in the indicator regressor,
there are no instances where the point estimate makes significant jumps. The estima-
tors are relatively robust.44 For the Monte-Carlo technique, I assume that baby weight,
measured in integer ounces, results in a pure measurement error of up to 0.5 ounces, and
add noise (up to ± 14 grams) to each birth weight observation. I then re-estimate Model
(9) and iterate – recording the point estimates for each iteration. The resultant bell-
shaped point estimate distribution ranges between -0.0264 and -0.0208 for the < 3000
gram weight group. Recall, the point estimate obtained from Model (9) was -0.0245, this
44The results of the estimation process is shown in the Appendix in Figure A1.1.
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result appears to be robust in the context of the mass point distribution of birth weight.45
In addition to checking the robustness of the point estimates I check the robustness
of the standard errors. Specifically with regard to the cluster-robust variance estimator,
which I employ at the county level across models with 23 groups, researchers are con-
cerned that few groups, correlations between groups, and asymmetric groups can lead to
understated standard errors and thus, overstated statistical significance (Cameron and
Miller, 2010). Carter, Schnepel, and Steigerwald (2013) indicate that test size rapidly
increases as the number of groups descends below 20, and that significant reduction in the
effective number of groups can occur with inter-correlation between groups. Cameron,
Gelbach, and Miller (2008) find, in the presence of a small number of clusters, bootstrap-
ping can be effective with as few as 6-8 groups. I employ the wild cluster bootstrap-t with
H0 imposed as outlined and recommended by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) and
find some inflation compared to the t-distribution for the results in Model (9). However,
the statistical inference based on the cluster-robust standard error remains unchanged
and the difference-in-differences estimates remain significant at the levels indicated in
Table 1.6.
1.5.2 Infant mortality
Using monthly panel data by county between Jan 1972 and Feb 1982, I estimate the
effect of the TSP shock on the infant mortality rate. The regression estimates for Models
(11) through (18) are found in Table 1.8. Recall the regressand in Models (11) through
(14) is the standard formulation of infant mortality (the numerator is the number of
children less than one year old who die within the given month), while in Models (15)
through (18) I adjust the numerator to be only those infants less than one month old
45The cluster robust standard errors for all iterations are significant at the 5% level. The distribution
of point estimates is shown in the Appendix in Figure A1.2.
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who die during the month. The interaction term is not of the expected sign and is not
statistically significant in any model specification. As anticipated, the standard error is
smaller on the interaction term for Models (15) through (18). However, the negative sign
remains and the point estimates are not significant. Though a positive effect of the ash
fall on infant mortality cannot be ruled out,46 there appears to be no statistical basis to
conclude that the TSP shock had the expected impact on infant mortality. In order to
check this result, I run a Poisson regression on the deaths count data by county-month.
Consistent with the results above, the Poisson regression point estimates for Models (14)
and (18) are also not of the expected sign and not significant.47
Table 1.9 shows the regression results of reformulating the data from the standard infant
mortality rate to birth-month cohort mortality rates. This allows me to estimate the
effect of the TSP shock on infant mortality depending on which infants were in utero
at the time of the eruption and which had already been born. In Model (22) there is
a weakly significant effect on the mortality rate for infants who had been born 0 to 3
months before the eruption. However, the sign of the effect is negative and not easily
interpretable. This sign is consistent when using a poisson regession model on the count
of birth month cohort deaths and is not dependent on an influential observation or county,
but it is sensitive to the assumed error variance-covariance structure.48 The signs on the
estimated coefficients for those babies exposed whilst in utero are also negative, but none
are significant. Only the coefficient on the effect of the TSP shock for infants 3 to 6
months old at the time of the eruption is of the expected sign. However, this estimate is
also not significant.
46One-sided tests on the interaction point estimate include zero.
47Poisson regression results are reported in the Appendix in Table A1.4.
48The standard error is larger using heteroskedastic robust estimation compared to the cluster robust
estimation I use in the paper. This result is discussed briefly in the Appendix.
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1.6 Discussion
1.6.1 Threats to validity
It is recognized that this study, like many natural experiments, is not without shortcom-
ings. The treats to the validity in this case include dynamic effects, such as unobserved
compensatory actions, and correlated or causal changes in activity and circumstance,
and the whether or not the ash fall exposure constituted a TSP shock.
In general, it is likely that women who were expecting the birth of their child, or mothers
and/or care-givers of infants, might have acted to compensate for a perceived health im-
pact to themselves or their child as a result of the ash fall. Infants and pregnant women
may have remained indoors for extended periods, visited their doctor more frequently, or
moved out of the affected area. Furthermore, these hypothesized actions could be corre-
lated with unobserved characteristics of the mother (such as income). Attenuation would
result in the first case, the second could threaten identification. Such compensatory ac-
tions, have the potential to reduce the validity of the quasi-experimental treatment on
birth weight and infant mortality. It has been discussed, though, that high levels of par-
ticulates were measured in all common indoor settings,49 and that there was generally
a high degree of ambivalence to ash exposure. Furthermore, interstate highways in the
ashfall affected areas were closed resulting in no opportunity to leave the affected area
for a number of days.
Any impact of the ash fall would also be a function of the associated effects as a result
of a disruption in routine and/or circumstance. Higher levels of stress, concern, and
uncertainty as a result of the eruption, increased time indoors and associated sedentary
49See Chen and Zhao (2011) for an overview and review of studies measuring the correlation between
indoor and outdoor particulates.
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activities, loss of real income, ingestion of ash on food or in water, etc, are potential con-
cerns that affect the validity of the treatment. A mother’s exposure to stress inducing
events while pregnant is known to affect birth outcomes and infant mortality to some
degree (Mansour and Rees, 2012; Currie and Rossin-Slater, 2013). It is possible that the
results I find are a result of associated effects and not directly from the TSP shock itself.
With regard to job loss, there appears to be no dip in State employment following the
eruption, and the Monthly Labor Review published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
makes no mention in 1980 of any reference to the eruption.50 However, employment is
only one factor for a singular event that still remains in the consciousness of those af-
fected by it.
In the case of ingesting water contaminated with ash – most of eastern Washington is
arid or semi-arid with water pumped from relatively deep wells – there was little concern
about contamination Warrick et al. (1981). Furthermore, the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration performed laboratory testing of ash, it’s solubility in water and acids, and found
no hazardous trace elements. Milk samples were also analyzed with no evidence of health
hazards (Center for Disease Control, 1980f). Never-the-less, the perception of risk of in-
gesting something harmful as a result of the event may have produced a placebo effect
that cannot be ruled out.
The effect of the air quality shock from the ash fall may be more complex than the simple
difference-indifferences estimator that I have used to model it. For this reason I estimate
county-specific time trends and models with leads and lags. However, as discussed by
Wolfers (2006), further dissection of the estimated effect may exacerbate or ameliorate a
potential bias by mis-specifying the actual dynamic effects. This is certainly one reason
50Among similarly weighty employment matters in 1980, the MLR reports on events entitled “Kansas
City bakery workers get new contract” and “GPO female bookbinders awarded back pay”.
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for limiting the primary analysis to nine months after the eruption.51 Another is that
the exact physiological pathway of particulate pathology is also not well understood.
It may also be the case that what I have described as a TSP shock was in fact a massive
dust shock. This is to say that the results I find are due more to the effects of larger
dust size ash particles than the much smaller suspended particulates. In addition, the
occurrence of dust particles with smaller particulate matter could mitigate the efficacy
of the TSP shock, since, as shown by Horwell and Baxter (2006), smaller particles often
adhere to coarser particles; this in turn reduces the ability for fine particulates to reach
deep into the lung. Never the less, the scanning electron microscope images by Horwell
and Baxter reveal particles in Mount St Helens ash uniformly less than 10 microns; the
ashfall was indeed a TSP shock – if not a PM10 shock.
1.6.2 Costs of particulate matter shocks
While the particulate pollution shock of Mount St Helens is certainly an outlier event
relative to those regulated by the EPA, it clearly delineates the effect of a single particu-
late event on at-risk fetuses. I use my results to compute the cost of a single 150 µg/m3
PM10 particulate shock event,52 as well as the benefit from the 1987 reduction of the
24-hour PM10 primary standard from 260 µg/m3 to 150 µg/m3.
Assuming a simple linear effect without a threshold, and using the result for the <3000
gram birth weight group from Model (9), I calculate the effect of a single, hypothetical,
51The exogenous loss of a fetus, either from a discrete event or from a systemic change, may result
in a number of dynamic effects which may be difficult to estimate. For example, an expectant mother
who miscarries may or may not seek to become pregnant again. In aggregate this could either lead to
a later surge in births, or a dip as potential mothers differentially forgo having additional children that
they might have conceived were it not for the exogenous fetal death that they suffered.
52150 µg/m3 is the current 24-hour standard set by the EPA, and has been since 1987.
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150 µg/m3 shock as a 0.000205 percentage point decrease in the number babies born.53
Assuming this shock affects a metropolitan US area of about median size (population
250,000), and assuming the birth rate of this hypothetical city is the current national
average (13 births per 1,000 population per year)54, and that 3
4
of the babies to be born
within the next year are in utero55 at the time of the particulate shock, I calculate that
about one half (0.5) of a birth on average would be terminated as a result of a single
150 µg/m3 PM10 shock.56 Using the EPA’s value of a statistical life,57 I estimate the
cost (only in terms of statistical life) of a single particulate shock at $3.7 million (2006
dollars).58
To calculate the benefit from the 1987 reduction in the 24-hour PM10 standard I count
the number of single-day PM10 events in excess of 150 µg/m3 across all States for 1986
and 1988, then naively ascribe the difference to the 1987 policy change. In 1986 there
were 187 events exceeding the 1987 24-hour standard , while in 1988 there were 153
such events between same counties59 as measured by air quality monitors.60 Using the
county population estimates from the U.S. Department of Commerce61 and the national
average birth rate for 198862 I estimate around 80 births would have been terminated
53Estimate derived by dividing 0.0245 percent points by the average of the two known particulate
readings, one in Yakima and the other in Spokane, on the day of the eruption, i.e. 18k µg/m3, then
multiplying by 150.
54NCHS CDC FastStats for 2010 http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/births.htm
55Gestational length is approximately 9 months – thus is it reasonable to assume at a given point in
time, on average 3/4 of the babies to be born within the next 12 months are in utero.
56Calculation: 0.4996 = 250k × 13 × 0.000205 × 0.75
57EPA Mortality Valuation Guidelines estimate the value of a statistical life at $7.4 million (2006
dolars), http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/webpages/MortalityRiskValuation.html
58This value may understate the full cost of a single particulate shock since it does not include impacts
to others (including the mother), both aesthetic and medical.
59There are 319 counties with single-day PM10 readings common between both years. The single-
day sampling rate is higher in 1988 for those same counties by 2842 observations. Thus the difference
between the number of PM10 events is attenuated and may be much higher.
60PM10 daily monitor data available from http://www.epa.gov/ttnairs1/airsaqs/archived
%20data/index.htm
61http://www.census.gov/popest/data/historical/1980s/county.html
62Vital Statistics of the United States, 1988. Volume I, Natality.
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had it not been for the reduction in 150 µg/m3 PM10 events. This reduction in the
estimated number of terminations corresponds to a benefit (only in terms of statistical
life) of $592 million (2006 dollars). This estimate could be considered an underestimate
given most particulates originate from the combustion of fossil fuels and are considered
more deleterious than the relatively inert ash particulate from which the calculated ef-
fect is based. Furthermore, this estimate does not include the value of other health and
aesthetic benefits.
The assumptions I make in deriving these estimates are certainly strong. However, for
reasons outlined previously, I consider these estimates as lower bounds. To my under-
standing these estimates represent the only values placed on a single particulate matter
shock. Given the EPA has continued to strengthen the 24hr PM standards since the
inception of the Clean Air Act, these estimates are long overdue. Looking forward it
would be advantageous to estimate the marginal effect of a single particulate shock in an
quasi-experimental setting. It could be possible to utilize the Mount St. Helens ash fall
in this endeavor by correlating the depth of the ashfall and the distance from the eruption
with particulate levels. Determining this relationship would require a significant level of
effort since there are only two particulate matter readings on the day of the eruption and
there are significant differences between the ash mass to depth ratio across the affected
area. Furthermore, this line of investigation would also require locational information of
births at a finer scale than the county level. Despite this, the Mount St. Helens eruption
might represent one of the best settings in which to estimate the marginal effect of a
particulate shock.
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1.7 Conclusion
I use the incidence of ashfall from the 1980 eruption of Mount St. Helens as a quasi-
experimental treatment for exposure to a single particulate shock on infants. Ninety
percent of this ashfall is in the coarse to fine size range (> 10µg/m3) and categorically
PM10 or lower. I find no evidence to suggest that exposure to this shock increased infant
mortality, but do find significant evidence to indicate babies were prematurely termi-
nated while in the womb. It could be the case that these premature deaths harvested the
fetuses likely to have died as infants after birth, but by carefully utilizing the discrete
timing of the event, I find no evidence to suggest that the infant mortality rate dropped
among babies born after the eruption either. What is striking are the statistical results
suggesting that babies that would have filled out the lower range of the birth weight
distribution are particularly vulnerable to a particulate shock. As a result of exposure
in utero I estimate there were about 227 fewer babies born in the 20th percentile of the
birth weight distribution. Also striking is the evidence to suggest that these at-risk fe-
tuses seem to be much more susceptible to the terminal effect of a particulate shock in the
early stages of development. Of those at-risk fetuses exposed during the first trimester
of development I estimate around 1 in 6 suffered early termination. Extrapolating these
results down to the current 24-hr standard for coarse particulates I calculate that a 150
µg/m3 shock on a median sized U.S. metropolitan area is likely to result, on average, in
the early termination of one half of a birth.
This quasi-experimental setting and the results highlight effects of suspended particu-
lates (and air pollutants in general) that until recently have received little consideration
- that is their deleterious effect on babies whist in utero. This and other recent studies
clearly indicate that air pollution affects human health at the very origins of individual
life. Thus prior estimates of the effects of air pollution, and the policies that have been
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implemented on their basis, may significantly undervalue the costs.
Regarding the link between infant mortality and a given particulate shock I find no
evidence to suggest there is any relationship between the two in this setting. Given that
particulate pollution is the only criteria pollutant categorized solely on the basis of size,
not chemistry, it could be the case that species difference in particulate origin is relevant
for discussion and research. The particulate matter from the Mount St. Helens ashfall
is relatively inert in composition; if, by convention or association we believe there is a
causal connection between particulate shocks and infant death then an avenue of future
research might look to investigate the relative toxicity of different types of particulate
pollution.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1: Periodic TSP monitor readings for Yakima county, Washington, in log scale with
a reference line showing the, then current, EPA 24hr maximum standard.
Sources: US EPA Air Quality System data and (Center for Disease Control, 1980g)
Figure 1.2: The extent of the May 18th Mt St Helens eruption ashfall over Washington.
Note: Treated counties are shaded. Non-treated counties are hash marked. Marginal counties not
used in the analysis are left unmarked.
Source: (Sarna-Wojcicki et al., 1981).
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Figure 1.3: Mean TSP levels by month for treated and non-treated counties
Source: Author’s tabulation of EPA AQS data
Figure 1.4: Infant mortality rates by year for treated and non-treated counties
Source: Author’s tabulation of NCHS Multiple Cause Mortality data and birth record data
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Figure 1.5: Birth weight kernel densities for treated and non-treated counties
Source: Author’s tabulation of NCHS birth record data
Table 1.1: Cofactor summary statistics for treated and non-treated counties, 1978-79
Non-treated Treated
Min Max Mean Mean
Early prenatal care 0 1 0.7936 0.7738
Gestation length (weeks) 17 52 39.93 39.72
Hospital birth 0 1 0.9722 0.9885
Male 0 1 0.5146 0.5130
Married 0 1 0.8882 0.8704
Mother’s age (years) 13 49 25.047 24.767
Mother immigrant 0 1 0.0524 0.0837
Multiple birth 0 1 0.0174 0.0203
No prenatal care 0 1 0.0051 0.0061
Premature birth 0 1 0.0689 0.0776
Teenage mother 0 1 0.0415 0.0521
White 0 1 0.9300 0.9303
n=27,815 n=18,014
Source: NCHS Birth Data Files.
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Figure 1.6: Effect of in utero TSP shock exposure on birth weight distribution by weight
category with 9-month leads and lags
Note: Grey bands indicate eruption timing at t=0. Line caps indicate 95% confidence range (by cluster
robust standard errors). The results are based on data ranging from 1/1/1973 through 12/31/1988.
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Figure 1.7: Effect of in utero TSP shock exposure on birth weight distribution by weight
category with 3-month leads and lags
Note: Grey bands indicate eruption timing effect window on 3rd, 2nd, and 1st trimester at t={0,1,2}
respectively. Line caps indicate 95% confidence range (using cluster robust standard errors). The results
are based on data ranging from 1/1/1973 through 12/31/1988.
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Table 1.2: Comparison of infant mortality rates (deaths/births)
Non-treated Treated Difference
deaths per 1000 births
May-June-July 1979 51/4715 31/3101 -0.820
May-June-July 1980 68/4977 44/3213 0.032
2.846 3.698 0.851
Source: NCHS Birth Data Files & Mortality Multiple Cause Files.
Table 1.3: Comparison of mean infant birth weights (grams)
Non-treated Treated Difference
May-June-July 1979 3461 3399 -62
May-June-July 1980 3452 3421 -31
-9 22 31
Source: NCHS Birth Data Files.
Table 1.4: Difference in differences estimates for TSP shock exposure on infant birth
weight (natural log birth weight in grams)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ash county -0.0189*** -0.0099*** -0.0099*** -
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021)
In utero 0.0042** 0.0047*** -0.0021 -0.0021
(0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0039) (0.0038)
Ash × In utero 0.0092*** 0.0041 0.004 0.004
(0.0021) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0031)
Group controls no yes yes yes
Month & Year FE no no yes yes
County FE no no no yes
R-squared 0.002 0.287 0.289 0.289
N 215,386 170,647 170,647 170,647
Note: cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (county).
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.5: Difference in differences estimates for TSP shock exposure on infant birth
weight during trimester (natural log birth weight in grams)
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Ash County -0.0189*** -0.0099*** -0.0099*** -
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021)
In utero 1st tri 0.002 0.0015 -0.0125*** -0.0125***
(0.0033) (0.0018) (0.0039) (0.0039)
In utero 2nd tri 0.0100*** 0.0090*** 0.0026 0.0027
(0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0047) (0.0046)
In utero 3rd tri 0.0005 0.0037 -0.0012 -0.0011
(0.0033) (0.0023) (0.0045) (0.0044)
Ash × In utero 1st 0.0126*** 0.0092* 0.0089* 0.0087*
(0.0042) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0046)
Ash × In utero 2nd 0.0048 -0.0045 -0.0046 -0.0048
(0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0033)
Ash × In utero 3rd 0.0104** 0.0068 0.0067 0.0070*
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0040)
Group Controls no yes yes yes
Month & Year FE no no yes yes
County FE no no no yes
R-squared 0.002 0.287 0.289 0.289
N 215,386 170,647 170,647 170,647
Note: cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (county).
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.6: Linear probability model estimates for TSP shock exposure on infant birth
weight
<2000g <2500g <3000g <3500g <4000g <4500g
Ash county - - - - - -
In utero 0.003 0.0061** 0.006 0.0007 0.0041 -0.0006
(0.0016) (0.0028) (0.0046) (0.0078) (0.0060) (0.0023)
Ash × In utero -0.0035** -0.0090*** -0.0245*** -0.0076 -0.0015 0.0004
(0.0013) (0.0025) (0.0035) (0.0072) (0.0047) (0.0018)
Group controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Month & year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
County FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Depd var mean 1.9% 5.5% 19.5% 55.3% 87.0% 97.5%
N 213,085 213,085 213,085 213,085 213,085 213,085
Note: cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (county).
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.7: Linear probability model estimates for TSP shock exposure during trimester
on infant birth weight
<2000g <2500g <3000g <3500g <4000g <4500g
Ash county - - - - - -
In utero 1st tri 0.0029 0.0093* 0.0252** 0.0161 0.0155* -0.0037
(0.0027) (0.0051) (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0078) (0.0028)
In utero 2nd tri -0.0003 0.0033 0.0019 -0.0022 0.001 -0.0013
(0.0019) (0.0033) (0.0070) (0.0108) (0.0068) (0.0027)
In utero 3rd tri 0.0048** 0.0065** 0.0003 -0.0027 0.0018 0.0019
(0.0019) (0.0029) (0.0049) (0.0095) (0.0072) (0.0026)
Ash × In utero 1st -0.0038** -0.0135*** -0.0321*** -0.0054 -0.0038 0.0029
(0.0017) (0.0037) (0.0078) (0.0098) (0.0064) (0.0026)
Ash × In utero 2nd -0.0016 -0.0093*** -0.0276*** -0.0027 0.0077 0.0039
(0.0022) (0.0028) (0.0077) (0.0094) (0.0067) (0.0034)
Ash × In utero 3rd -0.0050* -0.0047 -0.0146** -0.0137 -0.0078 -0.0053*
(0.0025) (0.0051) (0.0059) (0.0110) (0.0067) (0.0031)
Group controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Month & year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
County FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Depd var mean 1.9% 5.5% 19.5% 55.3% 87.0% 97.5%
R-squared 0.038 0.068 0.056 0.040 0.022 0.008
N 213,085 213,085 213,085 213,085 213,085 213,085
Note: cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (county).
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.9: Difference in differences estimates for TSP shock exposure on birth month
cohort infant mortality (per 1000 births)
(19) (20) (21) (22)
Ash county 1.994* 1.411** 1.378** -
(1.027) (0.6697) (0.6357)
In utero 1st tri -1.313 -2.200 -6.659 -6.580
(2.129) (2.124) (5.096) (4.889)
In utero 2nd tri -0.1227 -0.1978 -6.513** -6.499**
(1.136) (1.200) (2.410) (2.396)
In utero 3rd tri 5.572** 4.792** -0.8926 -0.8595
(2.023) (1.892) (2.933) (2.917)
Ex utero 0-3mo. 1.883 1.178 -5.232** -5.229**
(1.122) (0.891) (2.257) (2.238)
Ex utero 3-6mo. 0.2132 -0.0785 -4.125* -4.143*
(1.205) (1.301) (2.046) (2.064)
Ash × In utero 1st -2.974 -2.274 -2.323 -2.601
(3.383) (3.545) (3.516) (3.523)
Ash × In utero 2nd -0.4914 0.0027 -0.1141 -0.4087
(2.118) (2.185) (2.169) (2.174)
Ash × In utero 3rd -4.526 -3.864 -3.943 -4.128
(2.820) (2.948) (2.927) (2.936)
Ash × Ex utero 0-3mo. -3.899** -2.749 -2.936* -3.353*
(1.849) (1.601) (1.591) (1.642)
Ash × Ex utero 3-6mo. 2.551 2.506 2.476 2.375
(1.783) (1.790) (1.781) (1.797)
Group controls no yes yes yes
Month & Year FE no no yes yes
County FE no no no yes
R-squared 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.09
N 2,242 2,235 2,235 2,235
Note: regression weighted by #births, cluster robust std errors (county).
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Appendix
Omitted Variables
Heteroskedastic robust standard errors calculated for the Poisson regression model were
found to be significantly smaller than the cluster-robust standard errors presented in
Table A1.4 and used elsewhere in my paper. This may be caused by negative correlation
between the residuals and the explanatory variables – negative correlations exist between
the residuals and immigrant status, gestation length (used in the regressions), as well as
father’s and mother’s education (not used in the regressions due to the extremely large
number of missing observations). While the exact cause of the difference in standard
errors is not known, I speculate that it may be the result of omitted variables, such as
household income, welfare assistance, and smoking, that are not available. The omission
of these variables cannot be directly overcome and is a limitation. However, the residuals
are not correlated with the indicators for those counties affected by the ashfall, the timing
indicator for the 9 months after the eruption, or the product of the two (the difference-
in-differences indicator).
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Figures and Tables
Figure A1.1: Linear probability model estimates for TSP shock exposure on infant birth weight
Note: The grey area covers the 95% confidence region (using cluster robust standard errors).
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Figure A1.2: Quasi-Monte-Carlo difference-in-differences estimator distribution for the <
3000g LPM [Model (9)]
Note: Kernel density plot of 2000 iterations; the dash reference line is located at the Model (9) regression
point estimate.
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Table A1.1: Summary of the criteria pollutants regulated by the EPA and their effects
Pollutant Respiratory Pathway Primary Effects Source
Carbon
monoxide
Readily binds to
hemoglobin
Metabolic degradation, oxy-
gen impairment
U.S. EPA (2010)
Lead Absorption into the
blood stream
Anemia, cellular membrane
dysfunction, nerve dysfunc-
tion, neurochemical alteration
U.S. EPA (2006a)
Nitrogen
oxide
Not fully determined
(ozone precursor)
Internal epithelial cell damage,
increased susceptibility to vi-
ral infection
U.S. EPA (2008a)
Ozone Interaction with com-
pounds in the epithe-
lial lining fluid
Neural reflexes, air-way in-
flammation, lung disease
U.S. EPA (2006b)
Particulate
matter
Lung irritant Stress response, cardiac
arrhythmia, endothelial
dis-function
U.S. EPA (2004)
Sulfur
oxide
Dissolves in the
blood stream into
constituent ions
Bronchial restriction and
inflammation, cancerous cell
mutation
U.S. EPA (2008b)
56
Table A1.2: Linear probability model estimates for TSP shock exposure on infant birth
weight with county-specific time trends
<2000g <2500g <3000g <3500g <4000g <4500g
Ash county - - - - - -
In utero 0.0018 0.005 0.0014 -0.003 0.0046 -0.0008
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003)
Ash × In utero -0.0018 -0.0062* -0.0126*** 0.0022 -0.0029 0.0007
(0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002)
Group controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Month & year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
County FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Depd var mean 1.9% 5.5% 19.5% 55.3% 87.0% 97.5%
N 213,085 213,085 213,085 213,085 213,085 213,085
Note: cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (county).
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A1.3: Linear probability model estimates for TSP shock exposure during trimester
on infant birth weight with county-specific time trends
<2000g <2500g <3000g <3500g <4000g <4500g
Ash county - - - - - -
In utero 1st tri 0.0022 0.0082 0.0204* 0.0125 0.0164* -0.0039
(0.0029) (0.0053) (0.0106) (0.0103) (0.0080) (0.0032)
In utero 2nd tri -0.001 0.0022 -0.0025 -0.0059 0.0014 -0.0015
(0.0022) (0.0038) (0.0062) (0.0102) (0.0064) (0.0030)
In utero 3rd tri 0.0042** 0.0055* -0.0042 -0.0063 0.0021 0.0017
(0.0020) (0.0029) (0.0043) (0.0089) (0.0072) (0.0027)
Ash × In utero 1st -0.002 -0.0107*** -0.0195** 0.0049 -0.0055 0.0034
(0.0013) (0.0037) (0.0080) (0.0085) (0.0073) (0.0028)
Ash × In utero 2nd 0.0002 -0.0065 -0.0159* 0.0071 0.0063 0.0044
(0.0024) (0.0042) (0.0091) (0.0101) (0.0083) (0.0037)
Ash × In utero 3rd -0.0033 -0.0021 -0.0033 -0.0042 -0.009 -0.0049
(0.0025) (0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0104) (0.0078) (0.0033)
Group controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Month & year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
County FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Depd var mean 1.9% 5.5% 19.5% 55.3% 87.0% 97.5%
R-squared 0.038 0.068 0.056 0.040 0.022 0.008
N 213,085 213,085 213,085 213,085 213,085 213,085
Note: cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (county).
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A1.4: Poisson regression difference in differences estimates for TSP shock exposure
on infant mortality (per 1000 births)
Infant Mortality Rate Age <1mo. Mortality Rate
Ash county - -
Eruption window (12mo.) 0.2117** 0.1922
(0.1064) (0.1399)
Ash county × window -0.1255 -0.1312
(0.1940) (0.1651)
Group Controls yes yes
Month & Year FE yes yes
County FE yes yes
N 2,304 2,304
Note: regression weighted by #births, cluster robust std errors (county).
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Chapter 2
Free Energy and Social Norms:
Electricity Conservation Through
Peer Comparisons.
60
Summary
With my colleague Daniel Moncayo I investigate the informational effect that social
comparisons play in household electricity use. We employ a randomized field experiment
to present individuals with a social norm that encourages them to conserve electricity by
comparing their consumption to that of an “energy efficient neighbor,” consisting of the
average of the 10th percentile of participants’ electricity consumption. Utilizing smart-
meter data, we find households that received our informational treatment reduced their
electricity consumption by an average of 7%, even though the treatment was private and
there was no financial incentive to conserve. We also discover that conservation gains are
largest during the peak morning and evening hours.
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2.1 Introduction
In 2009, United States households used approximately 10.2 × 1015 Btu’s of electricity,
worth an estimated value of $230 billion (US EIA, 2009). This level of consumption
contributed to over 2 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide emitted into the atmosphere,1
a non-trivial fraction of the estimated 32 billion metric tons of global carbon dioxide
emissions that same year. Due to global concerns about the effect of these emissions
on the environment, many supply-side interventions have been advanced as the leading
solutions to reduce emissions. However, the effective implementation of these policies has
been mixed (UNEP, 2012).
An alternative avenue of research suggests that social norms2 can be successful in
mitigating hard to manage externality problems, such as air pollution (McGinnis and
Ostrom, 2008; Ostrom, 2014). Yet the influence of social norms is not well understood
and is not always universal.3 This is the case in the field of energy conservation, where
results are not entirely definitive. Many confounding effects prevent researchers from
reaching a consensus as to the direction and magnitude of the effect of social norms on
households’ electricity demand. Even so, their effectiveness to elicit energy conservation
responses is generally encouraging (Allcott and Mullainathan, 2010).
We use a randomized control trial to estimate the informational effect of a particular
type of social norm, a social comparison,4 as a potential driver of household electricity
conservation. The isolation of this effect is possible due to the near ideal setting where
the field experiment takes place: participants live in near identical housing, have no pe-
cuniary motives for conservation, are consumption naive, and can be mutually identified
1Calculated using the US EPA’s eGRID data, http://cfpub.epa.gov/egridweb/ .
2Social norms are inter-relational constructs that define the boundaries and mores of acceptable
behavior within a group.
3In some studies social norms are found to have little or no effect, see Viscusi, Huber, and Bell
(2011) in the case of recycling, Beshears et al. (2011) for retirement savings, and National Science and
Technology Council (2015) for pharmacist over prescription of controlled substances.
4A social comparison is a type of social norm message that, in this context, reveals one’s level of
consumption in comparison to others (be it a group or individual).
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as a peer group due to their relative social homogeneity. We also analyze the strategic
placement of the social comparison within the electricity consumption distribution of the
participants. Using an agent-based model, we posit that a social comparison placed to
the left of mean should elicit larger behavioral responses from treated participants. Si-
multaneously, this placement should also ameliorate a potential counter-productive norm
reversion response.5
We test these hypotheses using a social comparison we called the “energy efficient
neighbor,”6 which is constructed using the average of the 10th percentile of electric-
ity consumption. This comparison was presented weekly to treated households through
graphs that compare their hourly consumption patterns to that of the “energy efficient
neighbor” for 10 weeks. As a result we find that treated households reduced their elec-
tricity consumption by around 7% – as compared to an average reduction of 2% found in
similar studies that use the mean as the social comparison. Conditioning on prior house-
hold energy consumption reveals that on average all treated participants differentially
reduced their energy consumption. Even so, qualitative evidence, found by analyzing
participants’ survey responses, indicates that some individuals’ behavior is not strictly
consistent with the norm-reversion hypothesis. While treated participants’ attitudes
generally moved toward energy conservation, there are some portion of high-energy use
participants that turned away from conserving electricity. This dissociative effect sug-
gests there is an optimal placement for the social comparison, one that takes into account
that some individuals are dissuaded from energy conservation when the social comparison
is too far away.
As part of our study we find evidence that clarifies when households choose to conserve
energy. The use of high frequency data allows us to estimate the timing and progress of
5Norm reversion occurs when individuals on either side of the distribution converge to the revealed
social norm.
6This normative appellation was given for descriptive purposes only and should not convey to the
reader any notion of economic efficiency per se.
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changes in electricity consumption throughout the 10-week treatment period by hourly
intervals. Our estimates reveal that treated households choose to conserve the most
electricity during the waking morning and evening hours when consumption is typically
the highest. We also find evidence to suggest that households learn and improve upon
their conservation efforts over time, as indicated by an increase in treatment effectiveness
as our intervention progresses.
The findings in this paper contribute to the literature on social norms by establishing
a well-defined estimate for the informational effect of a social comparison. Our research
shows that in a near ideal environment devoid of many competing factors, the social com-
parison approach can yield significant reductions in energy use. More importantly, these
reductions can be achieved in a way that is easily scalable and replicable using electronic
communications. On the theoretical side, our social comparison model clarifies the poten-
tial mechanism though which social comparisons affect individual behavior, and provides
testable recommendations of ways to improve upon our experimental design. In all, the
results presented in this paper and the potential of further improvements, strengthen
the case that social comparisons may be used as a policy tool alongside pecuniary and
supply-side interventions to address carbon emission levels.
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2.2 Social norms and comparisons
2.2.1 Social norms research
There has been strong interest in social norm messaging in the context of energy policy to
reduce household energy consumption. During the energy shortages of the 1970’s there
was an initial surge of this type of research,7 and beginning in the 2000’s there has been
a resurgence with the popularization of climate change as a global concern.8
The overarching message of these studies is that social norms influence individual
and household energy use, and that energy conservation can be encouraged by providing
consumption feedback messaging. Conglomerating these studies Delmas, Fischlein, and
Asensio (2013) perform a meta-analysis (156 individual studies) and find the average
treatment effect (ATE) of some type of social message and informational consumption
feedback on energy use is -7.4%, with a range that extends from -55% to +18.5%. Those
characterized by Delmas, Fischlein, and Asensio as lower quality (primarily the earlier
studies) have an ATE of almost -10% in energy use reduction, while those they designate
of high-quality have an ATE around -2%.
The number of research studies conducted on social norms and energy use has not led
to a clear consensus on the magnitude or direction of the effect that social norms have
on electricity demand. This is not a surprise given the diversity of experimental designs.
For instance, Allcott (2011) presents 600,000 households with a modified electricity bill
that includes a comparison of their own historical consumption level to other households
7See Abrahamse et al. (2005) for a review of this research. For notable studies see Pallak and
Cummings (1976); Seaver and Patterson (1976); Hayes and Cone (1977); Seligman and Darley (1977);
Becker (1978); Bittle, Valesano, and Thaler (1979); Winett, Neale, and Grier (1979); Midden et al. (1983).
8There are a few studies scattered during the late 1980’s and 1990’s such as Sexton, Johnson, and
Konakayama (1987); van Houwelingen and van Raaij (1989); Wilhite and Ling (1995); these do not cite
specific policy motivations.
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(a descriptive norm9) with smiley faces (an injunctive norm10), and energy reduction
suggestions. This intervention reduced treated household energy consumption by 2% on
average. On a much smaller scale Delmas and Lessem (2014) provided 66 university dorm
room residents with public and private electricity use information. They use green and red
dot stickers as the public injunctive norm, and energy-use levels as the private descriptive
norm. The authors find that while private information has no statistical effect on energy
consumption, the public treatment reduces dorm electricity use by 20%. In a similar
public display study, Petersen et al. (2007) find that utilizing publicly visible energy-use
indicators (injunctive norm green to red glowing ‘orbs’) in a college dorm competition
reduced consumption by 32%. Conversely with no social message, Carrico and Riemer
(2011) find that office employees collectively reduced energy consumption by 4% and 7%
respectively when peer educators and monthly emails were used to disseminate energy
use feedback with energy reduction goals.
The diversity of social messaging and experimental settings used in each study makes
it difficult to compare their effectiveness. Differences between the types of social norms
and messaging tend to obscure the mechanisms at play in behavioral responses. For
example, consider a treatment that includes both descriptive and injunctive norm mes-
sages delivered to households that pay for electricity – it is natural to question the degree
to which households might reduce consumption because they are influenced by the two
types of social norms embedded in the informational treatment, or the desire to save
money relative to their previous consumption levels or that of their peers, or because
of reminders and suggestions about how to save electricity. These difficulties are exac-
erbated when social comparisons are utilized since households may or may not consider
the information about those to whom they are compared as valid.
9Descriptive social norms are formed on the basis of perceiving the actions or outcomes of others.
Individuals act to conform with the perceived norm.
10Injunctive social norms generally construe to individuals what is, or is not, acceptable behavior
through social cues. Individuals act to receive or avoid (respectively) those social cues.
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In this paper we disentangle many of these confounding factors by designing a field
experiment that allows for a clean identification of the informational effect of a social
comparison on electricity demand. Preceding the presentation of our experimental design
and results we clarify the factors, both social and pecuniary, that determine individual
household demand for electricity. Modeling preferences and social norms allows us to
illustrate how our field experiment isolates a social norm as the underlying motive for
the change in participant behavior. This also informs and motivates the selection of our
social comparison. Finally, it outlines a basis from which to compare our results to the
literature and suggests direction for future research.
2.2.2 Preferences over consumption and social norms
Our theoretical framework to study the effect of social norms on household energy con-
sumption builds on the work of Levitt and List (2007) and Ferraro and Price (2013).
It contains two main parts: utility from consumption and utility from social compar-
isons. The first component models utility from the consumption of electricity services
and a composite private good. The second captures social factors associated with the
consumption of electricity. These two types of utility allow us to study the mechanisms
at play when we subject individuals to informational feedback interventions and their
possible reactions to different kinds of social comparisons.
Individuals, indexed by j ∈ 1, 2, ...,Mi, are residents of households referenced by the
subscript i ∈ 1, 2, ..., N . The set of N households represents a group of mutual peers.
This relationship could be geographical, like a community, a college, a neighborhood,
or an apartment complex. It could be determined by demographic characteristics such
as age, gender, race, education, housing type, or wealth. Finally it could be based on
ideological, historical, or cultural commonalities. The key feature of this peer group is
that its members are influenced by social norms imposed on each other based on their
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common interests or characteristics, and their behavior is governed by implicit or explicit
expectations about what is acceptable within the peer group.
For an individual j living in household i, preferences are represented by the utility
function:
Wi,j = U (eij, xij)−D (γij,Λ) . (2.1)
The first term, U(·), represents the utility derived from a consumption bundle of two
goods – the quantity of personal services, ei,j, conveyed by consuming electricity (such
as the light from the use of a light bulb), and the consumption of a composite private
good xi,j. The good eij is produced by combining housing services, hi, and electricity,
i,j, using the household production function g(hi, i,j). Housing services captures the
characteristics of the residence i that are complementary to electricity consumption,
such as the availability of natural light or the number of light bulb sockets available.11
The expression i,j is the quantity of electricity (kWhr) demanded by individual j in
household i, and is aggregated to the household level from each individual’s choices
within the household through the function E(i,j) ∀j ∈ i. Each individual determines
their demand for electricity and the aforementioned goods based on their preferences
while limited by their budget constraint:
yi,j = qhhi/Mi + qi,j + qxxi,j (2.2)
for any exogenous income yi,j and prices {qh, q, qx}.12
The second term in equation (2.1), D(·), represents the non-pecuniary aspects asso-
ciated with the choice of i,j as it relates to descriptive social norms. This type of social
norm influences a household’s electricity demand based on how its electricity consump-
tion differs to that of other households’ within the peer group. These norms are often
11In this paper we will not discuss the process by which households are formed. We assume households
are formed ex-ante.
12The budget constraint implies that each individual within household i pays an equal proportion of
the housing services cost.
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presented as social comparisons where a normative standard and the participants’ own
level of consumption is presented side-by-side. We define γij as the strength to which so-
cial comparisons affect individual ij’s behavioral response and Λ as the social comparison
function.
We model γij and Λ using the theory of social comparisons developed by Festinger
(1954). In his work Festinger argues that when there is no objective way to evaluate per-
formance, individuals will opt for comparing themselves to the performance or opinions
of others in the following ways:
(a) Individuals will choose a peer comparison group that closely resembles their charac-
teristics relevant for such a comparison.
(b) Having chosen a peer group, individuals have the tendency to change their own
position so as to move closer to the group’s, and if possible, influence the group’s
position to move closer to their own.
(c) Individuals reevaluate their position in the peer group: an individual’s tendency to
compare them-self to a peer group decreases as the difference between their own
opinions and actions and those of the peer group increases.
These claims inform the basis for our mathematical formalization of a social com-
parison function. This function depends on three main factors. First, it depends on a
comparison group K, which may be a subset of the peer group N , or the entire group.
Second, on information about the comparison group’s consumption, as represented by
the social comparison metric Γ(K). This function summarizes any information given
to individuals about the electricity consumption of their comparison group as part of
an experimental or policy intervention.13 As shown below and following previous stud-
ies, a possible specification for Γ(K) is the arithmetic mean of the comparison group’s
13The mean of the entire distribution is used in many instances, such as Ferraro and Price (2013). In
the context of charitable giving, Shang and Croson (2006, 2009) use the upper percentiles (90th, 95th,
99th) of the distribution.
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electricity consumption. Third, it depends on household i’s electricity consumption, i.
Combining these elements we present the social comparison function Λ as:
Λ
(
i,Γ(K)
)
=
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
k − i
)2
. (2.3)
The functional form for Λ is consistent with claim (b), which states that individuals
will want to move closer to the comparison group, i.e take steps to change energy usage
towards the social comparison (norm reversion). A household that consumes an amount
above the revealed comparison, Γ(K), would receive dis-utility from their comparatively
higher level of consumption, which in turn would incentivize them to reduce electricity
consumption. Similarly, households that consume less than the revealed comparison
would alter their behavior to consume more electricity.14 The exponent term serves to
make these incentives proportional to the difference in consumption. This means that
the further away the household is from the social comparison, the greater their incentive
to conform to the norm.15
The parameter γKi,j is a function of the comparison group K, and captures the effec-
tiveness of the social comparison function in influencing an individual’s behavior. This
effect can be determined by various factors, such as the idea expressed in claim (a): the
strength of the social comparison depends on the characteristics of the comparison group
K. For example, Shang, Reed, and Croson (2008) find that participants in their experi-
ment react more strongly to social comparisons when the comparison group is comprised
of individuals of the same gender. This dependence on the compatibility between the
treated individual and the comparison group’s characteristics leads us to expect variation
in the effectiveness of a social comparison across participants. In addition, individuals
14We make the assumption that the peer group in our experimental setting is large enough that the
other part of Festinger’s claim (b), where individuals try to influence the group to move closer to their
position, is effectively nil.
15The exponent in this case may be any even natural number ie: µ ∈ 2N. Without loss of generality
we assume µ = 2.
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may respond differently to different social comparison metrics as expressed in claim (c).16
Together, γKi,j and the social comparison function Λ(·) from equation (2.3) describe the
total effect of a social comparison on individual utility:
D(γij,Λ) = γ
K
ij
(
1
K
K∑
k
k − i
)2
. (2.4)
The individual’s optimization problem
By outlining preferences, we can characterize the effect of social norms on individual
electricity consumption. Assuming that individuals act rationally, and maximize their
utility given a specific social environment {γij,Λ(K,Γ)}. Individual j living in household
i chooses a vector {ij, xij} that solves the following problem:
max
ij ,xij
Wij = U
(
eij, xij
)− γKij ( 1K ∑Kk k − i)2
s.t.
yij = qhhi/Mi + qij + qxxij
eij = g(hi, ij)
i = E(ij)
The solution for electricity demand, ∗ij(yij, hi, qh, q, qx,Λ(K,Γ)) depends on a myr-
iad of factors that can prevent researchers from making definitive statements about the
informational effect of social comparisons in different experimental settings. For exam-
ple, in a setting where households pay for electricity, the revealed information not only
changes the shadow price of electricity, but also feeds through to the level of private good
consumption. Thus researchers would need to adjust for income and substitution effects
in order to estimate the pure informational effect of the social comparison.17 Moreover,
16For example, Shang and Croson (2006) find that participants whose consumption is below the norm
increase their consumption less than the decrease in consumption of participants above the norm. This
suggests that individuals are affected not only by whether they are below or above the norm, but also
their relative position to it.
17In other words, in this situation it may not be possible to hold other factors constant within ∗ij(·)
when adjusting an individual’s access to descriptive norms.
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there may be a negative correlation between electricity consumption and the strength of
the response to social comparison norms (γij) as evidenced by prior purchase of energy
efficient appliances. Such a correlation would confound, or at least attenuate, the esti-
mation of the informational effect of social comparisons. Additionally, the purchase of
such appliances would signal differences in housing characteristics, which are difficult to
analyze and control for when data on appliances is not available.
With respect to comparisons between experimental interventions, individuals and
households are part of different social environments that influence their decisions. An
estimate of the effect of social norms on electricity consumption is subject to differences
in the peer groups to which the participants’ belong to. Hence, comparisons between
experiments hinges on knowledge about the characteristics of their respective peer groups
and the social norms they enforce. As previously discussed, even though two experiments
use the same social comparison, there is no reason to expect that the effect will be the
same if the comparison group is perceived differently by those receiving the informational
treatment. For this reason, the choice of comparison group has a direct impact on the
magnitude and direction of its effect on electricity demand.
The behavioral response is also affected by which comparison metric the researcher
chooses to disclose. For instance, if the distribution of electricity consumption is symmet-
ric, and γi,j = γ, the model demonstrates that using the mean consumption level of the
entire peer group as the social comparison would encourage those participants above the
norm to decrease their consumption just as much as those below the norm are encour-
aged to increase theirs.18 Under these assumptions, the simplest form of norm reversion
leads to a zero estimate of a social comparison intervention. Contrast this result to the
norm reversion prediction under the same assumptions if the revealed social comparison
18If we relax this assumption and match γi,j to the results in Shang and Croson (2006), this functional
form for D(·) could explain in part the small, yet significant, estimates of the effect of social norms on
energy conservation where the mean level of energy consumption was chosen as the social comparison,
as reviewed in Delmas, Fischlein, and Asensio (2013).
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is above or below the mean. In the former case, the overall effect would be positive since
a majority of participants increase their consumption. If the latter is presented, then
the estimated net effect would be negative since the majority of participants decrease
their consumption. Even with a simple assumption about γi,j, otherwise identical field
experiments may elicit widely different results, depending on which social comparison is
used and the distribution of electricity consumption.
Considering these arguments, the ideal research design to investigate the informa-
tional effect of social norms would involve a set of participants who do not have any
pecuniary motives for electricity conservation. The social and demographic characteris-
tics of these individuals should be such that they are credibly perceived as a peer group,
ex ante. Furthermore, their social environment should be similar, so that comparisons
within this group are regarded as appropriate and relevant. Likewise, residential charac-
teristics and furnishings should be very similar, to the end that a reduction in electricity
consumption across households is directly comparable. Finally, the chosen social com-
parison should be strategically placed to minimize the impact of possible norm reversion
effect.
2.3 Experimental design
Experimental setting
The University of California Santa Barbara (UCSB) owns, operates, and manages a
number of residence halls and apartment complexes. Our field experiment involves one
particular off-campus UCSB apartment complex, which contains 200 apartments that
provide housing for around 800 single undergraduate students on an annual (9-month)
lease system. Of the apartments in the complex 10 are occupied by live-in staff and
are not included in the experiment and the subsequent analysis. From the remaining
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190 student occupied apartments, 95 were randomly selected to receive the experimental
treatment described in the next section, while the other 95 formed the status quo group
and received no treatment.19
Each apartment is built on an identical floor plan of around 900 square feet with
a kitchen, two bedrooms, shower, toilet, and family room. Light fixtures, appliances,
electrical outlets, and furnishings are identical across units; the apartments have no air
conditioners and use gas for central heating, hot water, and the stove range. In terms
of electricity use, each unit is metered for utilities, but residents only pay an individual
fixed monthly rent. The university covers all utilities and residents have no access to any
information on their usage. Therefore, all residents are simultaneously consumption naive
and have no pecuniary incentives to conserve electricity. Furthermore, the consumption
of electricity across apartments only differs by the behavior of its occupants and the plug
load they use. Consequently, we expect that any conservation efforts are made on the
intensive margin and are motivated by non-pecuniary benefits.
Participants’ attitudes and demographics
In consequence of signing a rental agreement with UCSB, students living in the apart-
ment complex are required to provide reasonably detailed demographic information about
themselves. This information is retained by UCSB and is used to provide programming
and services to the residents, and gives us a rich control dataset to work with. A se-
lection of resident demographic characteristics and the types of apartments within the
complex are shown in Table 2.1. In short, we know each resident’s age, gender, major,
college GPA, units taken last quarter, college standing, declared racial identity, vehicle
make/model/year, home town and country, and the type of apartment they rent (up-
19Ex-ante power analysis based on pre-treatment electricity consumption data of these apartments
indicated power is around 0.95 with α = 0.05 and a 5% treatment effect.
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stairs, downstairs, or ADA20). We also know whether roommates are self selected or
assigned by the housing compex staff. These data are aggregated to the apartment level
in our statistical analysis, and although treatment status is randomly assigned, there
are a few mean differences between the control and treated groups. Namely, there are
statistically fewer international students and undeclared majors in the treated group, as
shown in Table 2.1.
Two months prior to the beginning of the treatment period, we conducted a survey of
the apartment complex residents. This was administered as part of a University sponsored
survey of UCSB undergraduates that is conducted biennially to assess the environmental
and energy conservation attitudes of the student body. We use this survey to place
participants in the context of the rest of UCSB’s student body. A selection of comparative
statistics from this survey is presented in Table 2.2. These self-reported measures indicate
that the students living in the apartment complex are reasonably representative of the
general undergraduate student body in their attitudes and behaviors. Summarizing the
responses we deduce that most respondents recycle regularly, around half turn off their
electronics and computers regularly when not in use, and about one quarter are willing to
pay higher tuition (at least marginally) to help UCSB address its environmental impact.
We also conducted an exit survey at the end of the 10-week treatment period, which we
use to understand changes in participants’ attitudes related to energy conservation.
Electricity consumption data
Electricity consumption data was provided by Southern California Edison (SCE), which
is UCSB’s electricity service supplier. One year prior to the commencement of our field
experiment, SCE installed residential electricity smart meters21 in the apartment com-
20ADA refers to Americans with Disabilities Act compliant apartments. NB: All ADA compliant
apartments in the complex are located downstairs.
21Smart meters are electronic electricity meters that provide hourly, or better, interval monitoring,
across a wireless network. Over 38 million residential units in the U.S. are equipped with smart-meters
(US EIA, 2012).
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plex. These meters provide SCE with billing-grade hourly consumption data on every
apartment within the complex. As such we have the universe of hourly electricity con-
sumption for all apartments over a 15 month period comprising of two residential cohorts.
On average, weekly apartment electricity consumption is slightly lower at the weekend
and higher earlier in the week. The diurnal electricity use follows predictable patterns
with consumption increasing around sunrise, then falling away slightly during the day
only to rise again in the evening before falling precipitously in the very early morning.
The highest consumption levels occur around 9pm. These patterns of consumption are
seen in Figure 2.1, which presents the distribution of apartment electricity use by hour
and day of the week.
Treatment description
At the beginning of every week for ten weeks, between April and June 2013,22 we emailed
the occupants of every treated apartment23 an electricity consumption report. The status
quo group received no weekly email nor any information of any kind.24 Each report
included the amount of electricity in kilowatt hours consumed by that apartment over
the previous week, the commensurate amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) released as a
result of electricity generation,25 their peak 1-hour reading, a set of graphs depicting
hourly rates of electricity use over the previous week, and hypertext links to unsubscribe
and to the study Facebook page.
The apartment electricity usage graphs mentioned above served as our social com-
22The dates of treatment occurred over the Spring 2013 quarter of instruction for UCSB.
23We used the primary university email address of record for each resident (100% coverage). This
email is used for all university correspondence.
24We endeavored to preserve the status quo to maintain consistency between the treatment period
and prior quarters. Dummy or generic information emails were not sent; for the effect of such in general
the reader can refer to Midden et al. (1983), Carrico and Riemer (2011), Ferraro and Price (2013).
25We used a conversion factor of 0.724 between kilowatt hours and pounds of CO2. This is the
conversion factor used by UCSB Sustainability, a University organization, for evaluating electricity
reduction policies and programs and is based on local utility averages. As a point of reference, the U.S.
average CO2 emissions for 2009 was 1.22 pounds per kilowatt hour (US EPA, 2012).
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parison, which showed residents their household’s electricity consumption in comparison
to what was called the “energy efficient apartment.” This hypothetical apartment is the
social comparison metric (Γ(K)), and was constructed from the average of the apart-
ments within the 10th percentile of electricity use for the previous week.26 One graph
presented the recipient household’s hourly consumption along with the hourly consump-
tion of their peer “energy efficient apartment” and a second graph depicted the same
information only that a deviation over the efficient apartment level for a given hour was
filled with the color red, while a deviation under the efficient level was filled green. This
color coding emphasized the information conveyed by the comparison with the intent to
clarify the differences between above or below the efficient apartment for any given hour.
An example of the electricity usage graphs and labeling of our social norm messages is
shown in Figure 2.2.
The selection of the 10th percentile average as our social comparison norm was made
to ameliorate a hypothesized norm reversion effect and to elicit a larger energy conser-
vation effort from households. This choice can be justified by our model, which would
predict that where γi,j = γ and where the energy consumption distribution is symmetric,
the reduction in electricity by those above the social comparison would far outweigh the
increase by those below. Even if this particular assumption is not entirely accurate, based
on the evidence presented in Shang and Croson (2006) we still expect a larger reduction
in electricity consumption with our social comparison than if we used the mean of the
electricity consumption distribution as our norm. Similar to the population mean, our
comparison has the advantage of being simple and easily constructed for any population
where the electricity consumption distribution is known.
Finally, we recognize that many unsolicited emails are never opened. For this reason
we included the total amount of electricity used during the week in the subject line of
26The 10th percentile was determined using all the apartments in the complex with the exception of
any apartments that seemed unoccupied for the relevant week.
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each email, so that even if the email was not viewed in its entirety the most relevant
information would still be noticed. However, this would not preclude email recipients
from filtering the emails such that they are never seen. We do not know the extent to
which this occurred. However, as a way to quantify the efficacy of our delivery method
we tracked the number of emails that were directly opened, as shown by week in Figure
2.3, and the clicks to the field experiment Facebook page.
2.4 Experimental treatment effects
The randomized treatment-control setting of our field experiment lends naturally to the
employment of a simple comparison of means to establish the statistical significance
between groups. The hypothetical causal effect of the assigned binary treatment over
the period of the experiment can defined as E[y1i] − E[y0i] = δ, where i indexes the
apartment and y is the natural log of electricity consumption. Assuming counter factual
validity between groups and using Method of Moments, we define our estimator of δ as
δˆ = y¯1 − y¯0, where δˆ is the average treatment effect estimator.
A one-way ANOVA comparison of means reveals a statistical difference between
groups at the 5% level over the 10-week treatment period, where the mean of the treated
group is less than the control group. However, there are some characteristic differences
between groups in spite of the assignment randomization (as shown in Table 2.1). A two-
way factorial ANOVA testing the unconditional mean differences between the treatment
groups, the pre-treatment period and treatment period, and the interaction of the two,
also reveals a statistical difference between the treatment and control group during the
treatment period at the 5% level.
Recognizing these mean differences we proceed by estimating the difference in electric-
ity consumption between treatment and control groups using a difference-in-differences
estimand. Using demographic variables, apartment characteristics, and fixed effects for
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apartment (by cohort), time, and calendar events,27 we estimate the treatment effect
while controlling for other variables. Even though we have already established the statis-
tical significance of the treatment by our ANOVA tests, the use of a conditional estimator
is beneficial since it allows us flexibility in parsing out various treatment effects and re-
fines our standard errors. Our subsequent regression models follow the general form:
ln(kWhit) = β0 + β1(treated)i + β2(treat period)t + δ(treatedi × treat periodt)
+αi + τt + uit
where treated is a dummy variable for whether or not an apartment was treated, treat period
is an indicator for the Spring 2013 quarter of instruction when the experiment occurred,
δ is our parameter of interest, α references the set of apartment level variables, and τ is
the set of time relevant indicators.
2.4.1 Average and Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
Our regression results indicate apartments that received weekly emails which detailed
their previous week’s electricity consumption in comparison to an “energy efficient apart-
ment” reduced their consumption by about 7% in comparison to apartments that did
not.28 As presented in Table 2.3, we find that the results are robust and significant
across models with successive covariates, including apartment-cohort fixed effects.29 As
a simple robustness check we apply the difference-in-differences estimator to the quarter
of instruction prior to the treatment period; there is no statistical effect.30
Using the point estimates from column (4) of Table 2.3 we back out the levels impact
27These calendar events include University and public holidays, examination periods, and special non-
holiday dates (such as Halloween).
28Following Delmas and Lessem (2014) we sum the hourly consumption observations to the daily
level. The results are robust when totaled to the weekly level or kept at the hourly level.
29Although we use apartment-cohort level cluster-robust standard errors, our statistical inference
matches results obtained when using null-imposed wild cluster bootstrap-t inference per Cameron, Gel-
bach, and Miller (2008).
30Note that the data spans 15 months. The non-significance of the Spring 2013 quarter dummy in
Table 2.3 also indicates there is nothing particularly different about that quarter compared to the Spring
2012 quarter when there was a different residential cohort and no intervention.
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of the treatment by regressing kilowatt hours on the untransformed predicted values.31
We estimate that had the status quo apartments been treated, they would have reduced
their power consumption on average by 0.0118 kW. Over a 24-hour period, this reduction
is equivalent to turning off a 60 watt light bulb for 4.7 hours when it would otherwise
have remained on.32
We further analyze the difference in electricity consumption between treated and
control apartments across time by partitioning out the indicator in three ways. First, we
investigate whether this difference is constant through the treatment period across each
week. Here, as shown in Figure 2.4, we find that over the 10 week period, substantial
and significant reductions in electricity consumption did not occur until after the fifth
week of treatment. This shift in effect corresponds to the week following mid-term
exams, though we do not have a ready explanation for this correlation. There also
appears to be a downward trend in the difference in electricity consumption between
treated and control groups over the treatment time frame. This observation is consistent
with qualitative evidence from our resident attitude surveys. The results of the ex-post
survey suggest that treated residents increased their dialog within their apartment with
respect to energy conservation. It is plausible that the effectiveness of a consistent social
comparison treatment increases over time.
Second, we partition the treatment indicator by day of the week to see if residents
differentially reduce their consumption on different days. These estimates are shown in
Figure 2.5 where we see the largest decreases in consumption occur at the weekend and
on Wednesday and Thursday. There appears to be no statistical effect early in the week.
The latter is a curious result since the weekly emails were sent out on Mondays, and
we expected that our communications might have a larger effect around the time they
were viewed (Over 80% of the email-opens were on a Monday or a Tuesday). This result
31Failure to account for Jensen’s Inequality, i.e. in our case E[ln(y)] < ln(E[y]), would result in a
biased estimate of the treatment effect in levels. See Wooldridge (1994).
324.72 hours = (24h × 0.0118kW)/0.06kW
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suggests that the information conveyed is retained over the week and adjustments in
electricity consumption are made when, we can only assume, it is convenient to do so.
Thirdly, we partition the difference in electricity consumption between treated and
control apartments by hour of the day.33 These results reveal, as shown in Figure 2.6,
that the informational treatment significantly reduced electricity consumption in the
peak morning and evening hours, and less so in the very early morning hours and in the
afternoon. This result suggests residents may be more conscientious about reducing their
consumption at times when they are actively using electricity in their daily routine.
Finally, by conditioning the difference in electricity consumption between treated and
control groups on the quartile of consumption from the previous academic quarter, we
find that the effect strengthens until the third quartile then drops, as shown in Figure
2.7. However, we cannot discern statistically significant energy conservation differences
between quartile groups.
2.5 Discussion
2.5.1 Average Treatment Effect
Using billing-grade smart meter data we were able to present the residents of the treated
apartments with detailed information about their previous week’s electricity consumption
and a comparison to their low-electricity-use peers. Recall, that for all intents and
purposes, these are occupants of apartments that can only reduce energy consumption
on the intensive margin and have no financial incentive to use less electricity. Even so,
we measure a 7% reduction in electricity usage on average over the 10 week treatment
period. This average treatment effect is equivalent to raising the price of electricity by
33These regression models utilize hourly observations and not total daily consumption used elsewhere.
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27%-50% in the short run, and 12.8% in the long run.34 This effect is larger than the
2% reduction in electricity consumption found in recent studies, such as Allcott (2011),
Ayres, Raseman, and Shih (2009), and Costa and Kahn (2013).
The increased effectiveness of our informational treatment cannot be attributed to
a single factor due to the various differences among the experimental designs of similar
studies. From one perspective the increased effectiveness of our informational treatment
is surprising given residents of the apartment complex have no monetary incentive to
conserve electricity. On the other hand, households might find it easier to reduce their
energy consumption with the use of higher frequency feedback. This explanation seems
to be consistent with Ueno et al. (2006), who found a 9% reduction in electricity use for
a small set of new homes where very detailed on-demand energy information feedback
terminals were installed.
In addition to high frequency feedback, our social comparison contained detailed in-
formation about the differences in electricity consumption between treated apartments
and the comparison. Residents were able to see the disparity between their energy con-
sumption and that of their “energy efficient neighbor” by hourly intervals. They were able
to compare their consumption patterns and use that information to strategically focus
their conservation efforts. We observe this in the hourly disaggregation of the treatment
effect, which showed that treated households reduced their electricity consumption dur-
ing the peak morning and evening hours. We suggest that households sought to reduce
their energy consumption when the observed disparities between their consumption and
the social comparison were the greatest.35
The strength of our result might also be attributed to the similarity in housing char-
acteristics. Our experimental units consisted of homogeneous apartments with no large
34We calculated this figure from the -0.10 to -0.18 Reiss and White (2008) estimate of the short-
run elasticity of residential electricity demand in California with respect to a large, unanticipated price
change, and the -0.39 long run elasticity estimate from (Reiss and White, 2005).
35The counter-factual levels and variance are both relatively larger during the peak use times than
the off-peak times compared to those within the 10th percentile.
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electrical appliances such as air-conditioners, electric ranges, electric washers and dryers.
Households in other recent studies include a heterogeneous assortment of self-selected
large appliances. Discretionary use of smaller appliances and plug load might constitute
a much smaller fraction of the total electricity use in those households and could account
for why our estimated effect is larger.
Another explanation for the strength of our estimate could be due to the greater
applicability and credibility of the social comparison. Households in our study are rela-
tively similar in all respects and the residents are all aware of their mutual similarities.
The presentation of an “energy efficient” neighbor social comparison was proximal to
each treated household’s peers. In this way the validity and credibility of the comparison
to the treated individuals is established. Even so, as discussed by Festinger (1954) we
recognize that responses to social norms depend on the perception of the information to
the individual. Apathy can result as suggested by Festinger’s claim (c) where differences
are perceived to be significant or the comparison group unrepresentative. In fact, we find
evidence in our exit survey that corroborates this point: 9 out of 10 respondents who
said that their attitude had moved away from energy conservation were from the treated
group; most of which were in the 4th quartile of electricity consumption (i.e. those who
used the most electricity for the 3 months prior to the experiment) and none from the
1st quartile. Selected exit survey results can be found in the Appendix.
Finally, our preferred explanation for the relative strength of our experimental treat-
ment is the placement of our social comparison. Based on our model, we supposed two
things with respect to the social comparison in the context of our experimental set-
ting. First, the selection of a social comparison metric to the left of the mean would
exact higher conservation efforts. Second, the strength of the social comparison response
would increase the further the households consumption was from the comparison. The
estimates of the treatment effect by quartile of prior electricity consumption, shown in
Figure 2.7, appear to support our suppositions with this caveat. Those furthest away
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from our social comparison may have experienced some discouragement and thus their
efforts were less that we might have predicted. This can be inferred from the fourth
quartile estimate and from our exit survey results. The fourth quartile estimate appears
to be attenuated compared to the third quartile, and those whose attitude moved away
from energy conservation were correlated with those who used the most electricity.
2.5.2 Social comparisons as a policy tool
It has been suggested that non-pecuniary methods like social norms and social compar-
isons may be used as policy tools to encourage energy conservation. Though their efficacy
is currently questionable, our results show that in a near ideal environment the social
comparison approach can yield significant reductions in energy demand. We also show it
can be done in a way that is easily scalable and replicable using electronic communica-
tions. Even so, there are further gains to be made in understanding social comparisons.
Based on our model, we hypothesize that we can use participants’ observable characteris-
tics, particularly their historical levels of electricity consumption, to increase the overall
effectiveness of our approach.
Our model theorizes the importance of a descriptive social norm response function,
D(γi,j,Λ), in determining the effectiveness of a social comparison intervention. The
results we obtain from our field experiment provide useful information about some of
the features of D(·), and allow us to map out some of its characteristics. Our initial
hypothesis about the relative effectiveness of a social comparison based on its placement
seems to have been confirmed. However, the results suggest that the strength of the
norm reversion effect is subject to limitations. Some treated participants in our study,
particularly in the 4th quartile of pre-treatment electricity consumption, turned away
from energy conservation. This reduction in the effectiveness of the social comparison
toward one end of the distribution opens the possibility of the existence of an optimal
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placement of the social comparison.
In order to find such an optimal placement of a social comparison (if one exists), the
descriptive social norm response function would need to be sufficiently characterized.36 As
part of that characterization it seems possible that there can occur some dissociation from
the revealed social comparison. Based on our results, this may be an increasing function
of the distance between one’s consumption and the social comparison.37 Whether this
dissociation occurs at discrete distance or as continuous function of the distance from
our social comparison we cannot tell. If we assume that disassociation takes effect at
a discrete distance from the social comparison, the distance between the revealed social
comparison and the point of disassociation can be thought of as the effective range of the
social comparison, which we denote as r(Γ).38 We characterize the point of disassociation
as the point Γ. In our case, Γ would be located within the 3rd quartile, and r(Γ) would
span the distance between our chosen location for Γ (the average of the 10th percentile)
and Γ over the range of electricity consumption.
The location of a more effective social comparison might take into account the effective
range r(Γ) and be placed accordingly to increase the overall reduction of electricity use.
Recall that the revealed social comparison is arbitrary and can be adjusted to suit research
or policy objectives. Another alternative experimental or policy design might divide the
treated population into groups and make use of more than one social comparison. The
social comparison participants receive would be strategically placed to maximize, or at
least increase, their behavioral response. Figure 2.8 shows one possible design with two
divisions of a hypothetical population, where the first group receives social comparison
norm Γ1 and the second group receives norm Γ2.
39
36It is possible that there exists a universal descriptive social norm response function, but it is more
likely there are families of response functions, each belonging to particular peer groups or subgroups of
a population.
37This observation is consistent with Festinger’s claim (c) mentioned previously.
38Recall that Γ is the social comparison metric.
39We have implicitly assumed r(Γ) is constant across the distribution for any social comparison.
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We postulate that these two approaches, either the repositioning a single social com-
parison, or the use of more than one comparison for different subgroups, would elicit a
larger behavioral response than our original experimental specification for Γ. Similarly,
we posit that using other observable characteristics to customize social norm messages
could prove useful in settings where the participants are more heterogeneous than ours.
Tailoring messages based on household characteristics other than just prior consumption
levels could allow for more insightful and potentially effective social comparisons. In all,
by conditioning the social comparison(s) on observable variables, we suggest that social
scientists and policy makers interested in energy conservation could increase the effec-
tiveness of revealed social comparison interventions. These issues and more are left for
future research.
2.6 Conclusion
The field experiment we conducted provides convincing evidence that private social com-
parisons can encourage electricity conservation even when the marginal cost of consump-
tion is effectively nil. This demonstrates the potential efficacy of demand-side alternatives
as complements to supply interventions such as pollution taxes or constructed markets.
Our work suggests that households alter their behavior depending on the type of social
comparison they are exposed to. Our estimates are much larger than those of other
studies that use the mean as the descriptive norm. Reasons discussed for this difference
include our use of an increased frequency of feedback, temporally disaggregated informa-
tion, the use of a challenging social comparison, and the relative population homogeneity.
Our study estimates the timing and progress of changes in electricity demand by
showing that individuals choose to conserve when it is most convenient to do so, and that
they become more effective in their conservation efforts over the course of the treatment
period. On the other hand, we present evidence that the type of social comparison can
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have other effects on individuals – some participants who historically were high electricity
consumers seem to have been dissuaded from conserving energy. We hypothesize that
this is a function of the significant distance between their consumption levels and those
of our social comparison.
We argue that characterization of the descriptive social norm response function, as we
have modeled, opens the possibility of an optimal placement for a social comparison(s)
to induce larger responses in similarly structured interventions. We hypothesize that
future work in mapping out this response function will further improve the results of
social norm interventions, making them more attractive and predictable as policy tools
to mitigate pollution or to encourage other pro-social behaviors.
87
References
Abrahamse, Wokje, Linda Steg, Charles Vlek, and Talib Rothengatter. 2005. “A review
of intervention studies aimed at household energy conservation.” Journal of Environ-
mental Psychology 25 (3):273–291.
Allcott, Hunt. 2011. “Social norms and energy conservation.” Journal of Public Eco-
nomics 95:1082–1095.
Allcott, Hunt and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2010. “Behavioral science and energy policy.”
Science 327 (5970):1204–1205.
Ayres, Ian, Sophie Raseman, and Alice Shih. 2009. “Evidence from two large field ex-
periments that peer comparison feedback can reduce residential energy usage.” NBER
Working Papers 15386, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Becker, Lawrence J. 1978. “Joint effect of feedback and goal setting on performance:
A field study of residential energy conservation.” Journal of Applied Psychology
63 (4):428–433.
Beshears, John, James J. Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, and Katherine L.
Milkman. 2011. “The effect of providing peer information on retirement savings deci-
sions.” NBER Working Papers 17345, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Bittle, Ronald G., Robert M. Valesano, and Greg M. Thaler. 1979. “The effects of
daily feedback on residential electricity usage as a function of usage level and type of
feedback information.” Journal of Environmental Systems 9 (3):275–287.
Cameron, A. Colin, Jonah B. Gelbach, and Douglas L. Miller. 2008. “Bootstrap-based
improvements for inference with clustered errors.” The Review of Economics and
Statistics 90 (3):414–427.
Carrico, Amanda R. and Manuel Riemer. 2011. “Motivating energy conservation in
the workplace: An evaluation of the use of group-level feedback and peer education.”
Journal of Environmental Psychology 31 (1):1–13.
Costa, Dora L. and Matthew E. Kahn. 2013. “Energy conservation “nudges” and envi-
ronmentalist ideology: Evidence from a randomized residential electricity field experi-
ment.” Journal of the European Economic Association 11 (2):680–702.
Delmas, Magali, Miriam Fischlein, and Omar Asensio. 2013. “Information strategies
and energy conservation behavior: A meta-analysis of experimental studies from 1975-
2011.” Energy Policy 61:729739.
Delmas, Magali A. and Neil Lessem. 2014. “Saving power to conserve your reputation?
88
The effectiveness of private versus public information.” Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 67 (3):353–370.
Ferraro, Paul J. and Michael K. Price. 2013. “Using nonpecuniary strategies to influence
behavior: Evidence from a large-scale field experiment.” The Review of Economics
and Statistics 95 (1):64–73.
Festinger, Leon. 1954. “A theory of social comparison processes.” Human relations
7 (2):117–140.
Hayes, Steven C. and John D. Cone. 1977. “Reducing residential electric use: Payments,
information, and feedback.” Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis 10 (3):425–435.
Levitt, Steven D. and John A. List. 2007. “What do laboratory experiments measuring
social preferences reveal about the real world?” Journal of Economic Perspectives
21 (2):153–174.
McGinnis, Michael and Elinor Ostrom. 2008. “Will lessons from small-scale social dilem-
mas scale up?” In New Issues and Paradigms in Research on Social Dilemmas.
Springer, 189–211.
Midden, Cees J. H., Joanne E. Meter, Mieneke H. Weenig, and Henk J. A. Zieverink.
1983. “Using feedback, reinforcement and information to reduce energy consumption
in households: A field experiment.” Journal of Economic Psychology 3:65–86.
National Science and Technology Council. 2015. “Social and Behavioral Sciences Team
Annual Report.” Tech. rep., Executive Office of the President, Washington DC.
Ostrom, Elinor. 2014. “A polycentric approach for coping with climate change.” Annals
of Economics and Finance 15 (1):97–134.
Pallak, Michael S. and William Cummings. 1976. “Commitment and voluntary energy
conservation.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 2 (1):3–13.
Petersen, John E., Vladislav Shunturov, Kathryn Janda, Gavin Platt, and Kate Wein-
berger. 2007. “Dormitory residents reduce electricity consumption when exposed to
real-time visual feedback and incentives.” International Journal of Sustainability in
Higher Education 8 (1):16–33.
Reiss, Peter C. and Matthew W. White. 2005. “Household electricity demand, revisited.”
The Review of Economic Studies 72 (3):853–883.
———. 2008. “What changes energy consumption? Prices and public pressures.” The
RAND Journal of Economics 39 (3):636–663.
Seaver, W. Burleigh and Arthur H. Patterson. 1976. “Decreasing fuel-oil consumption
through feedback and social commendation.” Journal of Applied Bahavior Analysis
9 (2):147–152.
89
Seligman, Clive and John M. Darley. 1977. “Feedback as a means of decreasing residential
energy consumption.” Journal of Applied Psychology 62 (4):363–368.
Sexton, Richard J., Nancy Brown Johnson, and Akira Konakayama. 1987. “Consumer
response to continuous-display electricity-use monitors in a time-of-use pricing exper-
iment.” Journal of Consumer Research 14 (1):55–62.
Shang, Jen and Rachel Croson. 2006. “The impact of social comparisons on nonprofit
fund raising.” Research in Experimental Economics 11:143–156.
———. 2009. “A field experiment in charitable contribution: The impact of social infor-
mation on the voluntary provision of public goods.” Economic Journal 119 (540):1422–
1439.
Shang, Jen, Americus Reed, and Rachel Croson. 2008. “Identity congruency effects on
donations.” Journal of Marketing Research 45 (3):351–361.
Ueno, Tsuyoshi, Fuminori Sano, Osamu Saeki, and Kiichiro Tsuji. 2006. “Effectiveness
of an energy-consumption information system on energy savings in residential houses
based on monitored data.” Applied Energy 83 (2):166–183.
UNEP. 2012. The Emissions Gap Report 2012. United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP), Nairobi.
US EIA. 2009. “Residential Energy Consumption Survey for 2009.” Form EIA-457 A and
C-G, United States Energy Information Administration, Office of Energy Consumption
and Efficiency Statistics.
———. 2012. “Annual Electric Power Industry Report.” Form EIA-861, United States
Energy Information Administration.
US EPA. 2012. “The Emissions and Generation Resource Integrated Database for
2012 (eGRID2012).” Tech. Rep. Version 1.0, United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency.
van Houwelingen, Jeannet H. and W. Fred van Raaij. 1989. “The effect of goal-setting
and daily electronic feedback on in-home energy use.” Journal of Consumer Research
16 (1):98–105.
Viscusi, W. Kip, Joel Huber, and Jason Bell. 2011. “Promoting recycling: Private values,
social norms, and economic incentives.” American Economic Review 101 (3):65–70.
Wilhite, Harold and Rich Ling. 1995. “Measured energy savings from a more informative
energy bill.” Energy and Buildings 22 (2):145–155.
Winett, Richard A., Michael S. Neale, and H. Cannon Grier. 1979. “Effects of self-
monitoring and feedback on residential electricity consumption.” Journal of Applied
Behavior Analysis 12 (2):173–184.
90
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 1994. “A simple specification test for the predictive ability of
transformation models.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 76 (1):59–65.
91
Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: Hourly distribution of electricity use by day of the week
Note: Median hourly consumption in black, shaded area between 5th and 95th percentiles
Source: Authors’ compilation of SCE smart meter data between Jan 7 and Mar 22, 2013
Figure 2.2: An example of graphs emailed to residents of an apartment
Source: Southern California Edison smart meter readings from May 2013
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Figure 2.3: Number of email opens by week
Source: Authors’ compilation of email data over the treatment period
Figure 2.4: Treatment effect by week
Note: Point estimates in black, 95% confidence intervals using cluster robust standard errors (apartment
cohort) shown as the shaded area.
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Figure 2.5: Treatment effect by day of the week
Note: Point estimates in black, 95% confidence intervals using cluster robust standard errors (apartment
cohort) shown as the shaded area.
Figure 2.6: Treatment effect by hour of the day
Note: Point estimates in black, 95% confidence intervals using cluster robust standard errors (apartment
cohort) shown as the shaded area.
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Figure 2.7: Treatment effect by consumption quartile
Note: Point estimates in black, 95% confidence intervals using cluster robust standard errors (apartment)
shown as the shaded area.
Figure 2.8: Two division social comparison design
95
Table 2.1: Selected descriptive variable comparisons
Control Treated
Min Max Mean Mean
Male apartment 0 1 0.51 0.43
Average age (years) 20 25.8 21.3 21.3
Average units taken (prev. quarter) 11.25 18 13.9 14.1
Average GPA (4.0 scale) 2.1 4 3.2 3.1
Self assigned (%) 0 100 75.4 78.5
Senior (%) 0 100 39.0 42.5
International student (%) ** 0 75 10.5 5.5
Transfer student (%) 0 100 54.1 56.8
Began UCSB as Freshman (%) 0 100 35.4 37.7
Major - undeclared (%) ** 0 75 10.5 5.7
Major - Communications (%) 0 100 25.2 28.4
Major - Environmental Studies (%) 0 50 2.6 2.7
Race - Black (%) 0 50 3.8 3.1
Race - Hispanic (%) 0 100 30.9 30.2
Race - Asian (%) 0 100 25.0 28.1
Vehicle - New (%) 0 100 16.9 18.6
Vehicle - American make (%) 0 100 8.4 6.5
Vehicle - SUV model (%) 0 50 5.9 8.4
Upstairs apartment 0 1 0.49 0.41
Cottage apartment 0 1 0.11 0.08
ADA compliant apartment 0 1 0.08 0.06
N 95 95
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.2: Environmental attitudes survey results
Apt. Complex UCSB
Junior or Senior (%) 98.9 56.0
Male (%) 37.2 33.3
Important to address own impact on the
environment (%)
95.1 92.4
Voted green in last election (%) 38.0 45.2
Member of an environmental group (%) 15.6 17.4
Regularly use recycle bins (%) 76.2 78.1
Regularly turn off electronics when not in
use (%)
55.4 50.4
Willing to pay higher tuition to protect the
environment (%)
26.0 27.7
Response rate 0.22 0.19
N 90 340
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.3: Average treatment effect estimates
Log(kilowatt hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated 0.0566 0.0566 0.0449 -
(0.0416) (0.0416) (0.0316) -
Spring 2013 0.0009 -0.0021 -0.0050 -0.0057
(0.0119) (0.0112) (0.0120) (0.0119)
Treated × Spring 2013 -0.0702*** -0.0702*** -0.0644*** -0.0630***
(0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0211) (0.0189)
Month & event FE yes yes yes yes
Day & hour FE no yes yes yes
Demographics & apt type no no yes yes
Apartment cohort FE no no no yes
Observations 56,807 56,807 56,807 56,807
R-squared 0.09 0.10 0.36 0.69
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (apartment cohort)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix
Energy conservation attitude changes
At the end of the experimental treatment period we conducted an exit survey that went
to all residents of the apartment complex. The purpose of this survey was to qualitatively
determine if there were any changes in energy conservation attitudes, and to shed light
on any actions used to conserve energy. Selected results are presented in Table A2.1.
We found significant differences between the responses of those in treatment and control
groups in some areas but not in others.
Compared to the control group, a larger proportion of survey respondents in the
treatment group reported talking more regularly with their roommates about energy
conservation. The reciprocal response was also significant; we find that almost half
of respondents in the control group rarely talked with their roommates about energy
conservation, while only 19% of the respondents in the treated population made this
claim.
About 40% of survey respondents who were in the treated group reported that their
attitude has moved toward more energy conservation; but only about 20% of status-
quo group respondents reported that shift. Fifty-two percent of the treated respondents
reported that their energy conservation attitude stayed the same, with almost 80% of
control group reporting no change. In addition, 8% of treated respondents said that
their attitude had moved away from energy conservation. Almost all of these were in the
upper percentiles of the electricity consumption distribution.
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Tables
Table A2.1: Exit survey results by treatment status
Mean
Control Treated
Talked regularly about energy conservation? *** 0.05 0.19
Talked rarely about energy conservation? *** 0.42 0.19
Attitude moved toward energy conservation? *** 0.22 0.39
Attitude stayed the same? *** 0.77 0.52
Attitude moved away from energy conservation? ** 0.01 0.08
4th quartile (high consumption users) *** 0.00 0.17
Took no effort to conserve? * 0.42 0.32
Regularly in agreement with roommates’ energy use? 0.35 0.31
Used computer less? 0.18 0.14
Turned off computer regularly? 0.43 0.39
Turned lights off regularly? 0.85 0.85
Took shorter showers regularly? 0.22 0.25
Likely to conserve over next 3 months? 0.84 0.76
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two sided t-test
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Chapter 3
Colonial Origins and Forestland
Outcomes: The Impact of
Institutions on Forests and Timber.
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Summary
This chapter examines the effect of country-level political stability and investment se-
curity on forestland use. Using cross-section data I find that these measures are associated
with benign outcomes for overall rates of forest area change and roundwood production.
These associations are robust when instrumented for endogeneity, and reveal stronger im-
pacts than OLS estimates would imply. Two-stage least squares results indicate that a
one standard deviation increase in political stability, as currently measured by the World
Bank, increases forest area by 12% over 10 years, and increases roundwood production
by a factor of 10 to 19. Targeting political stability and investment security may be one
of the most effective tools in mitigating carbon emissions through forest expansion and
increasing forest productivity.
101
3.1 Introduction
What are the reasons for significant variation in the levels of forest cover and forest use
among countries? Environmental Kuznets curves suggest a U-shaped relationship where
economic development drives environmental quality, including forest cover.1 Can the
level of a country’s development alone explain why some countries experience growing
levels of forest cover and others do not? The implied cause and effect of the Kuznets
reasoning belies the counter point that significant environmental degradation stifles eco-
nomic development. Along another line of reasoning, the underlying quality of property
rights and political institutions are considered to be both drivers of economic develop-
ment and environmental quality. Yet it may be the case that richer nations can ‘afford’
the kinds of institutions and laws that promote development (Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson, 2001) and environmental quality.
The endogenous interplay between property rights, enforcement, and natural re-
sources is clearly demonstrated in theoretical modeling by Copeland and Taylor (2009).2
Yet this simultaneity has been largely ignored in the empirical literature on forestland
use.3 Failure to account for endogeneity between forestland use and political institutions
would at best lead to a positive bias in empirical estimates if indeed richer countries can
afford – and generally choose – higher levels of environmental quality. In the worst case,
1Kauppi et al. (2006) observe that no country with per capita GDP over $4600 (2003 U.S. dollars)
experienced a declining level of forest stock in 2005. Naidoo (2004) finds a positive correlation between
the level of historical forest clearance and current economic growth. Deacon (1994) reports an association
between contemporaneous deforestation and lower economic growth.
2Copeland and Taylor present a model where “the success or failure in resource management” is
endogenously determined by enforcement power, harvesting capacity, and resource rents.
3Of the many empirical deforestation studies reviewed, only Alston, Libecap, and Mueller (2000),
and Araujoa et al. (2009) explicitly pursue an identification strategy that recognizes endogeneity between
deforestation and political stability. Both these papers were limited to deforestation in Brazil. Arcand,
Guillaumont, and Jeanneney (2008) instrument for exchange rates but not investment security in their
empirical estimation of deforestation.
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endogeneity would likely lead to ambiguous results.4 Disentangling this relationship is
required in order identify the causal impact of institutional robustness on forestland use
outcomes.
In this paper I exploit the same source of arguably exogenous variation used by Ace-
moglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), to estimate the degree to which political stability,
as measured by The World Bank (2015), and investment security, as indexed by Bohn
and Deacon (2000), affect forest cover change, and industrial roundwood5 production.
As revealed in the results, these causal relationships are are often quite different than
those which simple OLS correlations would imply. For example, while the OLS results
indicate that a one standard deviation change in investment security is correlated with
a 4 to 5% change in forest area over ten years, the IV estimates reveal the ceteris paribis
effect is double this. For roundwood production the difference between the two is over
four times larger. Compared to political stability, investment security stands out as the
more reliable measure. It tends to hold up better among a battery of robustness tests.
Though many papers investigate and reveal much about forest cover change, partic-
ularly with respect to deforestation, this paper fills a gap in the empirical literature by
applying a tried identification strategy to overcome the endogeneity between forestland
use and institutions. The results also support the idea that afforestation and timber pro-
duction are not strictly competing objectives, but strengthening institutions influences
benign forest cover change and increases roundwood production. To that end this pa-
per is laid out as follows – Section 2 presents a background of previous work in natural
resource exploitation in general and forestland use in particular with respect to institu-
tions and property rights. Section 3 describes the regression models and data I utilize,
4This may be seen to a degree in the environmental Kuznets curve literature with respect to the
empirical relationship between GDP and deforestation where results are often ambiguous. See Mather
and Needle (1999) for a brief discussion. Environmental Kuznets curve models, in general, are not
statistically robust (Stern, 2014).
5All roundwood felled or otherwise removed or harvested, except fuelwood. Includes pulpwood.
sawlogs, and veneer logs. FAO item code 1865.
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while Section 4 presents the results of the empirical analysis. Sections 5 and 6 contain a
discussion of the results and summary conclusions respectively.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Resource outcomes, institutions, and property rights
Coase (1960) defines the basis for almost all discussion on environmental outcomes and
property rights – the fact that property rights are not well defined, perfect enforcement
does not exist, and/or negotiation transaction costs are non-negligible leads us to the con-
clusion that individuals and governments do not operate in a first-best world. To this end
a great deal of research investigates the effect imperfect property rights and political in-
stitutions have on environmental outcomes. For example, modeling by Congleton (1992)
indicates that authoritarian regimes face relatively higher marginal pollution abatement
costs and will generally adopt less stringent environmental standards. While Fredriks-
son and Svensson (2003) theorize that although corruption unambiguously leads to less
stringent environmental law, the effect is attenuated by the level of political instability
– the incentive to bribe officials is reduced when the likelihood of a future payoff falls.
Ungoverned common pool renewable resources subject to population or demand pres-
sures can also lead to significant environmental degradation (Brander and Taylor, 1998;
Taylor, 2011). In order to avoid these ‘tragedies of the commons’ Dietz, Ostrom, and
Stern (2003) assert certain conditions, which include multi-layered governance (quality
of institutions) and rule compliance (property rights enforcement), that should prevail.
Regarding natural resource extraction, similar outcomes are theorized and observed
with respect to property rights and institutional quality. Unregulated fisheries tend to re-
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sult in over-harvesting6 and resource depletion (Gordon, 1953; Schaefer, 1957).7 Costello,
Gaines, and Lynham (2008) empirically demonstrate that well-governed catch shares can
prevent fishery collapse. Oil exploration and production is greater when ownership is
secure (Bohn and Deacon, 2000), while production volatility is lower among politically
open governments (Metcalf and Wolfram, 2014). The status-quo of the political environ-
ment, property rights, and contractual law can either hinder or help the maximization of
economic rents from both oil fields and fisheries (Johnson and Libecap, 1982; Libecap,
1984; Libecap and Wiggins, 1985).
3.2.2 Forestland uses, institutions, and property rights
Like the broad class of natural resource exploitation issues mentioned above, the role of
property rights is advanced as one of the leading factors in deforestation. In the context
of a Faustman model Mendelsohn (1994) demonstrates, even in the presence of small
eviction rates (whether lawful or not), that destructive activities dominate over sustain-
able forestland use. Also using a Faustman approach, Amacher, Koskela, and Ollikainen
(2008) show that migration pressures, expropriation risk, and insecure property rights
lead to illegal logging, agricultural expansion, and deforestation. Empirically, Southgate,
Sierra, and Brown (1991) find a positive correlation between land tenure insecurity and
deforestation in Ecuador. Forest clearing by indigenous land holders in Ecuador was fur-
ther found to be associated with rancher encroachment, but not other types of pressures
by Godoy et al. (1998). Alston, Libecap, and Mueller (2000) not only discover that land
reform and weak property rights in the Brazilian Amazon lead to forest clearing, forest
clearing also reduces the potential for violent conflict between landowners and squatters
(see also de Oliveira (2008); Araujoa et al. (2009)). In the case of Sierra Leone, conflict
6Over-harvesting with respect to long term economic rent.
7Open access fishery exploitation modeling of this sort has lead to a large body of bio-economic
fishery modeling; see Conrad (1989); Deacon (1989) for examples.
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itself tends to reduce deforestation (Burgess, Miguel, and Stanton, 2015). Somanathan
(1991) observes that the system of land tenure in the Central Himalaya is a fundamental
cause of deforestation. Conversely, Barbier and Burgess (2001) find no significant asso-
ciation between a property rights index and agricultural land expansion in Asia, Africa,
and Latin America; while Culas (2007) finds some evidence for an effect only in Latin
America.
Government stability and institutional quality is also thought to influence forestland
use.8 Deacon (1999), and Bohn and Deacon (2000) report broad significant associations
between their investment security index (which is based off government indicators and
political stability measures) and afforestation rates. Similarly, Didia (1997), and Mather
and Needle (1999) document a negative correlation between the level of democracy and
deforestation. Burgess et al. (2012) report increased deforestation in relation to increased
fragmentation of jurisdictional areas in Indonesia. Using the investment security index
Arcand, Guillaumont, and Jeanneney (2008) find only a week correleation between in-
vestment security and deforestation in some models. However, they do find evidence
to suggest deforestation may increase with ‘better’ institutions in developing countries.
Ferreira (2004) finds trade liberalization affects deforestation only conditional on its in-
teraction with measures of governance quality. Barbier and Burgess (2001) report an
overall significant positive association between political stability and agricultural land
expansion; though regionally the significance only extends to Latin America, but not
Africa or Asia. On the other hand, Bhattarai and Hammig (2001) present correlations
between institutional quality and deforestation for each of those three regions. There is a
degree of empirical conjecture regarding the roles institutions play in forest area change.
By using an instrumental variables identification strategy I am able to address what seem
to be endogeneity issues that encumber a number of previous studies.
8Some authors regard government and institutional indicators as proxies for property rights (Deacon,
1994; Knack and Keefer, 1995).
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Outside of deforestation the literature on political stability and forestland use is
sparse. Regarding forest burning Wright et al. (2007) observe that countries beset by cor-
ruption are less effective at maintaining tropical forest preserves from forest fire. Iliadisa,
Papastavroub, and Lefakis (2002) find that political instability in Greece is associated
with burned area and numbers of forest fires. Pokharel et al. (2007) very briefly mention
a lower incidence of fire in Nepal for forests under community management. On the ques-
tion of forest products, Ferreira and Vincent (2010) find that improvements in governance
indicators in countries with weak regimes are associated with increases in forest product
output. While others document the role of natural resource extraction, which includes
timber, in a political economy and conflict context (Lambin et al., 2001; Le Billon, 2001;
Smith et al., 2003; Johnston, 2004; Snyder, 2006; Caselli and Tesei, 2011). In order to
expand the literature a little further beyond deforestation this paper also investigates the
effect of robust institutions on industrial roundwood production. This approach also has
the benefit of determining whether afforestation and timber production are competing
outcomes or not across countries.
The significant consequences of deforestation have spurred a large body of empirical
research – some of which I have reviewed above. Were it not for the fact that identi-
fication strategies seem to be lacking from this literature generally, one might question
the need for more research on the subject. However, as Reduced Emissions from De-
forestation and forest Degradation (REDD) becomes a primary vehicle and program in
the developing world to mitigate the effects of global climate change, estimation of the
causal importance of political institutions is necessary.9 Since prior literature is largely
limited to deforestation, clearly more is needed to not only evaluate causal forest area
change determinants but also the drivers of timber production. This paper seeks to fill
these gaps.
9The programmatic potential of REDD to centralize forestland use planning at the national level
may or may not be uniformly beneficial (Phelps, Webb, and Agrawal, 2010; Thompson, Baruah, and
Carr, 2011).
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3.3 Political stability and forestland use
3.3.1 Regression models
I begin by following an outline of the afforestation regression model used by Deacon
(1999), and Bohn and Deacon (2000) where change in forest cover is a linear relationship
of the regressors of interest10 – measures of political stability and investment security, and
the environmental determinants of forest stock, along with demand variables for forest
services. I estimate regressions of the following basic form:
(1) yi = β0 + β1stabilityi + β2securityi + Xiγ + i,
where yi is the forestland use outcome for country i (either the change in forest area,
or the log of roundwood production), X is a vector of the other explanatory variables,
and  is a random error term. In order that the comparative impact of stability and
security on the forestland use variable may be assessed, I transform the two measures
into standardized (z-score) vectors. I assume the causal effect of stability and security,
i.e. β1 and β2, are greater than 0. All other things being equal, where there is an
idiosyncratic difference in either political stability or investment security between one
country and another, the country with the higher level will on average have a higher
level of afforestation (or at least an attenuated level of deforestation) and roundwood
production.
The reasoning for the assumptions about β1 and β2 is clear – in general, the provision
and effective enforcement of property rights decreases the discount rate associated with
postponing the realization of forest value.11 Thus instability and insecurity engender
the types of land use decisions that tend to increase the opportunity cost of waiting to
10Observationally, the linearity assumption is justified in Figure 3.1 as discussed in the Data section.
11This line of reasoning is modeled theoretically by Deacon (1999).
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liquidate the forest asset in favor of a short term cash crop. With respect to roundwood
production I follow the argument made by Bohn and Deacon (2000), that when property
rights are insecure, timber will be cut at an earlier age and replanting/regeneration efforts
will be lower, reducing the overall timber supply from the country.12
Within the vector Xi I include environmental attributes assumed to affect the pro-
liferation of forests. These include the initial or starting level forested area, the relative
abundance of freshwater resources, and the ratio of coastline to land area. As a physical
process, a larger starting extent of forest area and a larger ratio of coastline to land
area will tend to reduce the potential for forest expansion. With respect to roundwood
harvest, a larger forest will increase the opportunities for larger harvests, whereas a
higher ratio of coastline will tend to reduce those opportunities. A relative abundance
of freshwater resources will tend to increase potential forest growth, positively affecting
the likelihood for forest expansion. While this same effect might positively affect the po-
tential for roundwood harvest, an over abundance could also hinder the ease of harvest,
thus the square of the water resources variable is also included.
The vector Xi also includes variables assumed to affect the demand for forest land and
products – namely population and road density. Though the effect of population density
on deforestation is actively questioned (Carr, Suter, and Barbieri, 2005) I include it for
completeness in comparison to other papers. Roads are also thought to affect the demand
for forest land and timber products. In the former case it is argued that roads into forested
areas reduce the cost of forest exploitation (Nelson and Hellerstein, 1997), in the latter
case road density may proxy for economic development, which generally increases demand
for timber products (Chou and Buongiorno, 1984; Turner and Buongiorno, 2004)). Since
12I implicitly argue that, on average, the long run effect on timber supply will dominate over the
short run liquidation effect in my empirical analysis. Given that the security and stability measures do
not vary much between decades this assumption may seem reasonable. A departure from this argument
is the hypothesized influence of corruption on increased timber supply from illegal logging (Seneca
Creek Associates, LLC and Wood Resources International, LLC, 2004), where the short run effect may
dominate in some countries.
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the influence of GDP is often empirically ambiguous and also not included in the forest
modeling of Deacon (1999), and Bohn and Deacon (2000), I do not include it in the body
of this analysis. A brief discussion of results that include GDP as a regressor is found in
Appendix B.
I recognize that each country’s level of political stability and investment security is
not a random draw. If indeed countries with higher levels of stability and security tend
to demand higher levels of environmental quality, and if simultaneously environmental
quality positively affects national stability and security,13 then we might expect a positive
bias where an OLS estimator is employed. However, some have argued that an abundance
of natural resources may engender instability and insecurity (Le Billon, 2001; Snyder,
2006; Lujala, 2010),14 in which case we might expect a negative bias in an OLS estimator.
If both countervailing effects are valid then the estimator may not be identified and
estimates will be ambiguous.
Given endogeneity issues exist, I utilize an instrumental variables approach to identify
quasi-experimental impacts. The effectiveness of this approach hinges on two factors – the
exogeneity and validity of the instrument. I argue that settler mortality is a reasonable
instrument that satisfies both criteria. The validity condition is carefully established by
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), which I summarize as follows: the current
quality of a country’s institutional governance is a function of earlier institutions set
up during the colonial expansion by European countries. The quality of these early
institutions is function of the experience of early settlements, and the difficulty of their
establishment is measured by the level of settler mortality. Heterogeneous difficulty
in establishing settlements endures through to present levels of political stability and
investment security, and this establishes the validity of the instrument. However, the IV
system is under-identified with only only instrument, and as such the IV results below
13Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) find lack of rainfall is a precursor to civil conflict in Africa.
Hsiang, Meng, and Crane (2011) discover a correlation between a warm climate phase and civil conflict.
14See Ross (2004) for an evaluation and discussion of this literature.
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include one of each of the two regressors of interest. With some caution I present IV
estimates where both stability and security are included. These regressions use settler
mortality and early institutional variables as instruments.
To establish the exclusion restriction, I argue that the level of settler mortality in
previous centuries is functionally ergodic to current forest use. It is known that early
settlers utilized forests in particular ways that have some influence on the composition
of forests today.15 By in large settlers and colonialists cleared forests for agricultural
land and harvested wood products for timber and fuel; their methods and practices were
common. While the successful exploitation of forest resources for settler establishment
would have been influenced by the numbers of settlers who did not die, subsequent
forestland use today, in terms of deforestation and logging production, has no other
influence than the residual effect through the quality of the institutions that remain.
Land that may have been entirely cleared of forest cover by settlers has, since that time,
had more than a hundred years to recover (if left fallow or replanted) – a sufficient time
span for the establishment of mature stands in many cases,16 and/or to be converted to
agricultural, residential, or industrial uses.
3.3.2 Data and descriptive statistics
The data used in this analysis are arranged into two country-level cross-sections, one for
the 1990 decade and one for the 2000 decade. These data are presented as descriptive
statistics in Table 3.1 for the whole world as well as the settler subsample. Country-level
physical attributes are constant between the two decades and are only listed once in the
table. The settler subsample is not representative of the whole world. On average those
15See Brender (1974) as an example.
16Note that mature secondary forests are not akin to old-growth or primary forests. Of the estimated
5.6 billion hectares of primary forest prior to the 1700’s, approximately 1.4 billion hectares remain. The
balance of the current 4 billion hectares of forestland in the world is secondary forest (i.e. forest that
has been cut-over, cleared, or burned by humans at least once). See FAO (2012, 2015).
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countries have a higher rate of deforestation and lower political stability score. There
are also many fewer island states in the settler subsample, which is reflected in the much
lower coastline and roads to area ratio.
The dependent variables, namely change in forest area and log average annual round-
wood production are constructed from data in the U.N. Food and Agriculture database
FAOSTAT and the FAO Forestry database CountrySTAT. Change in forest area is the
difference between the 1990 and 2000, and the 2000 and 2010 forest area for each country
divided by the initial forest area (either 1990 or 2000, respectively). The log average
roundwood production cross-section for each decade is the natural log of the average
annual industrial roundwood production numbers for each country the the years 1990
through 1999, and 2000 through 2009. These and all other data used in this paper are
described in Appendix A.
Explanatory variables for land area and population density, as well as political sta-
bility are taken from the World Bank World Development Indicators, and Worldwide
Governance Indicators project respectively. The political stability measure is one of six
measures tracked as part of the World Governance Indicators project at the World Bank.
It “measures the perceptions of the likelihood or political instability and/or politically
motivated violence”.17 The values for each year are averaged for each decade for this
analysis. Roads and coastline data is obtained from CIA (2000). The investment secu-
rity index generated by Bohn and Deacon (2000), and settler mortality18 data utilized by
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), are from their respective personal websites.
The investment security index data is annual and is averaged for each of the two decades
for use in the regression models.
The country-level relationship between forest area change for the 1990 and 2000
decades, and standardized measures for political stability and investment security, are
17As quoted from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pv.pdf
18See Appendix B of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2000) for a complete description of the
settler mortality data and sources.
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shown in Figure 3.1. Observationally, all four plots demonstrate a positive correlation,
indicating that higher levels of political stability and investment security are associated
with forest area expansion. This relationship seems to be similar between decades and
appears to fit a linear approximation, which is at least a cursory justification for the
linear model proposed previously. However, there is some clustering around 0 percent
change, which could indicate at least one of two things. Conditional on a static political
and investment environment, countries may approach a steady state of forest cover. Or,
the process by which forest cover data is determined may be imprecise and biased toward
no change in certain countries. Both of these concepts could indicate processes that may
not be in keeping with a strict linear interpretation and are revisited later in the paper.
It should not be taken as given that the visual association between these two variables is
strictly one-directional. As has been discussed, stablity and security may lead to benign
forest area outcomes, at the same time the presence of conflict and instability can also
result in a reduction of malign forest outcomes (Burgess, Miguel, and Stanton, 2015).
The relationship of average roundwood production with political stability and invest-
ment security, as shown in Figure 3.2, appears less distinct than that for forest area
change but generally reveals a similar positive correlation. Higher levels of stability and
security are associated with greater roundwood output and the relationship can also be
interpreted by a linear approximation. There seems to be no particular difference in
the correlation between the two decades, indicating a degree of constancy in the system
between decades. However, as with forest area change mentioned above, it would be a
challenge to justify that trend lines through these points represents a functional relation-
ship between roundwood production and the two institutional robustness measures. For
this I rely on the IV approach that an instrument is exogenous and only influences the
regressor of interest.
I present the 1st stage relationship between political stability and investment security
with settler mortality in Figure 3.3. There appear to be reasonable downward linear
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trends with each of these measures - higher rates of settler mortality in the previous two
centuries are negatively correlated with stability and security for the previous two decade
cross sections. Notably the political stability variable seems to diverge, indicating a
particular heteroskedastic relationship where the variability of political stability increases
as settle mortality increases. Given political stability and investment security tend not
to have changed significantly between the two decades the graphs appear very similar.
In each of the four graphs there are two data points that stand out from the downward
trend - both The Gambia and Mali have among the highest rates of settler mortality yet
their stability and security both hover around zero.19 As potential outliers the impact of
these two countries is assessed in robustness checks that follow.
3.4 Model results
3.4.1 Forest area change
Ordinary least squares
Ordinary least squares estimates for the effect of investment security and political stability
on forest area change for the whole world and the settler subsample are presented in Table
3.2. The top panel of Table 3.2 contains the results for the whole world, the bottom panel
results are the for the settler subsample. Columns (1) through (3) contain the cross
section results when the change in forest area between the year 1990 and 2000 is used
as the dependent variable, while (4) through (6) contain the cross section results for the
change in forest area between the year 2000 and 2010. Columns (1) and (4) present results
when the z-score of investment security is used as the regressor of interest. Similarly,
the regression results in columns (2) and (5) use only the political stability regressor
19The particular reasons for these outliers is not known. Although USAID (November, 2011)
characterized Mali “as a stable democracy in the midst of the troubled West African region.”
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/countries/mali/
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of interest. Regressions in columns (3) and (6) use both measures and list the p-value
for the Wald test where the null is for both coefficients equal to 0. All models use the
environmental and demand factor variables discussed previously; the p-values for the
Wald tests where the respective variables of these two groupings are jointly equal 0 are
listed in each column.
The investment security point estimate in columns (1) and (4) for the world and set-
tler groupings varies between 0.027 and 0.053 with the standard error varying between
0.013 and 0.020. At face value a one standard deviation difference in investment se-
curity is correlated with 2.7 to 5.3% difference in forest area over 10 years. This level
of investment security would be the difference between countries like Botswana, Costa
Rica, or Bolivia, and Ireland, Finland, or Canada. The point estimate results for polit-
ical stability in columns (2) and (5) range from 0.028 to 0.037 between the world and
settler groupings, with standard errors varying between 0.010 and 0.016. A one standard
deviation difference in political stability is correlated with a 2.8 to 3.7% difference in
forest area over 10 years. The correlations between higher levels of investment security
and political stability are each significant at the 5% level or better for each of these four
sets of results. When both regressors are included in the model, as shown in columns
(3) and (6), the political stability measure is never significant and generally imprecisely
estimated close to 0. Investment security appears to be strongly correlated with benign
outcomes for forest area, much more so than political stability. The one departure from
this generalization is in the column (6) settler subsample result, here neither measure is
significant and both point estimates are about the same with similar standard errors. In
this regression the two measures are jointly not significantly different from 0 either.
Environmental and demand factors seem to be poorly correlated with changes in forest
area. As expected the extent of initial forest area is generally negatively correlated with
expanding forest coverage, but it is not often statistically significant. Point estimates for
the effect of the water to land ratio and the square of the water to land area ratio are
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generally of the expected sign but never significant. The coast to land area ratio is always
negatively correlated with higher levels of forest expansion and in some cases the point
estimate is significantly different from 0. There are only three of the twelve regression
results where environmental factors are jointly significant and then only at the 10% level.
Demand factor variables are never jointly significant. Individually, population density
and road extent point estimates often vary in sign between regression models and are
also never significantly different from 0. It seems there is little association for population
and roads with changes in forest area.
Instrumental variables
The IV results for the change in forest area between 1990 and 2000, and between 2000
and 2010 are presented in Table 3.3. The instrument used is log settler mortality and
the first stage results are presented in the lower panel of the table. The two regressors
of interest are included separately for each of the two decades of forest cover change.
These results compose columns (1) and (4), and (2) and (5), for investment security and
political stability respectively. As mentioned previously, I also use additional instruments,
comprised of early institutional variables, in order to include both regressors of interest in
the IV models. This I do with some caution since the separation from current institutional
performance may not be as distant as with settler mortality.20 Early institutions may
have a more direct role in current forest policy than settler mortality. As seen in the first
stage results in columns (3) and (6), the early institution measures are jointly significant
from zero for both the security and stability regressors of interest – while, in all but one
of the sets of results in columns (3) and (6), settler mortality is not significant in the
first stage. As might have been expected, the early institution variables overshadow the
settler mortality data in the first stage.
20Glaeser et al. (2004) investigate whether early institution variables or early human capital are
precursors of economic growth. They conclude the latter exerts a stronger influence.
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Utilizing the IV approach reveals that the quasi-experimental effect of the security
and stability measures on forest cover change to be much stronger than the OLS results
would imply. Where each measure is utilized separately, as in columns (1), (2), (4), and
(5), the point estimate is around 2 to 4 times larger, the larger difference being for the
political stability estimates. The IV estimates for investment security imply that a one
standard deviation change in this measure results in a 9 to 11% change in forest area
over ten years. A one standard deviation change in political stability would result in a
12 to 15% change in forest area. While the political stability measure now seems a little
larger in its effect on forest area change, with some trepidation I note that when both
variables are included in the IV regression, investment security is statistically significant
while political stability is not. The point estimate for security is also twice as large in
value compared to when it is the only regressor, as in columns (1) and (4). Stability is
not only not significant in columns (3) and (6), its sign is also negative. This indicates
that one should interpret the regression results with caution where both measures are
included.
The IV results appear to be reasonably robust to outliers. I mentioned earlier that
while Mali and The Gambia have among the highest levels of settler mortality their
security and stability measures are around 0, much higher than might be expected given
the downward trend observed in Figure 3.3. Excluding those two countries from the IV
regressions does not appreciably alter the point estimates or standard errors. On the other
end of the scale, dropping the four neo-Europe colonial countries of Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, and the United States does not meaningfully alter the results in Table 3.3
for investment security. The point estimates and standard errors for political stability
are, however, larger, and the result in column (5) is no longer significant. Similarly, if
the countries that report zero forest cover change are excluded from the IV regressions,
the security index results do not change, but the political stability result in column (5)
is no longer significant. Generally, the investment security index seems to be robust, but
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there is some question as to whether political stability is consistently reliable.
There is a body of literature that draws inference on economic outcomes from a
country’s legal origin (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine,
2003). Adding dummies for countries that were British and French colonies, and for
whether the country has a French legal origin does not change the IV results. However,
adding continent dummies to the IV regressions for Africa and Asia alters the results
somewhat. While the point estimates remain largely unchanged, political stability in
column (2) and investment security in column (4) are no longer significant even though
those two continent dummies are neither individually or jointly significant. For those
two regressions the continent dummies appear to affect the first-stage, while they do
not for the regressions in columns (1) and (5). Others suggest a link between economic
performance and religious composition (La Porta et al., 1999; Barro and McCleary, 2003;
Noland, 2005). However, adding variables for the percentages of Catholic and Muslim
adherents does not change the forest area change IV results.21
I further test the robustness of the IV models by including additional controls for
natural resource abundance and climate. Adding temperature and humidity controls af-
fects the significance of models that utilize political stability but not investment security.
Similar to the continent dummies, these controls are all jointly not significantly different
from zero, but they affect the first stage result for political stability. When the temper-
ature and humidity controls are included, the point estimates in the investment security
models are halved when compared to the baseline results in columns (1) and (4). When
controls for natural resource abundance (percent of the world’s reserves of gold, iron, oil,
silver, and zinc) are added, the significance of political stability in column (5) is altered,
the other point estimate values and significance remains unchanged.
Glaeser et al. (2004) critiques Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) by arguing
21It is interesting to note that while Muslim density has no significant effect in any model, Catholic
density is negatively and significantly correlated with forest area change in the models which utilize
investment security.
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that human capital, not institutions are primary drivers of economic growth. I check
the robustness of the settler mortality instrument by replacing it with the log years of
schooling in 1960 from Barro and Lee (2001).22 The point estimates for security and
stability in columns (4) and (5) are remarkably close when schooling is used, in columns
(1) and (2) the estimates are about twice as large. The statistical inference is unchanged,
each regressor remains significant.23
3.4.2 Roundwood production
Ordinary least squares
Ordinary least squares estimates for the cross-section regressions of average annual round-
wood production between 1990-1999 and 2000-2009 on investment security and political
stability are presented in Table 3.4. Columns (1) through (3) contain the results for the
first decade cross section, while columns (4) through (6) are for the second decade. In
columns (1) and (4) investment security is the only regressor of interest. In columns (2)
and (5) only political stability is included. Both measures are used in the column (3) and
(6) regressions. The table is partitioned horizontally between results for the whole world
(above) and the settler subsample (below). Between the two partitions there is little
difference in the point estimates for investment security in columns (1) and (4), though
the standard error is a little higher in the settler subsample. This is not the case for
political stability, where the the point estimates for the settler subsample in columns (2)
and (5) is half the value estimated for the whole world. The political stability estimates
in these columns are also not significant for the settler subsample, though they are of
22There are only 46 country observations common between the settler and schooling data – too few to
allow for a direct comparison of the point estimates as the instruments are very weak with this number
of observations. The described results using schooling as the instrument includes countries not available
in the setter subsample.
23The robustness of the IV results using log years of schooling in 1960 as an instrument should be
considered in the light of the critique of the settler mortality data by Albouy (2012) who parses out the
settler data according to particular apparent inconsistencies, and refuted by Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2012).
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the expected sign. At face value, a one standard deviation difference in investment secu-
rity is associated with about a 45 to 50 percent difference in average annual roundwood
production.
When security and stability are both included in the OLS regression for the whole
world, political stability stands out as having the stronger correlation with roundwood
output than investment security. In both cases in columns (3) and (6) the point estimates
for stability are larger and are statistically significant, while security is smaller and not
significant. Comparing the results for stability when it is entered by itself and when
combined with security, the point estimates for the whole world regressions are relatively
similar – this is not the case for investment security. However, these observations are
reversed in the lower panel for the settler subsample results. In this case the investment
security point estimates in columns (1) and (4) are strikingly similar to the point estimates
in columns (3) and (6), while it is the point estimates for political stability that are much
smaller when the two measures are included in the regression. The standard errors are
also somewhat larger in the settler subsample results, and there-in political stability is
not significant in the four regressions where it is included. In fact neither the security
nor the stability measures are significant when they are included together in the settler
subsample results. Additionally, they are not jointly significant either. Their combined
correlation with roundwood production is ambiguous, at least for the set of countries
that make up the settler subsample.
The environmental and demand cofactors are all jointly significant in the 12 different
sets of results. The extent of initial forest area has the strongest correlation with aver-
age roundwood production - a larger starting endowment of forest area, unsurprisingly,
is highly correlated with higher rates of average annual harvest. Other environmental
cofactors are generally of the expected sign though not significant, with the exception of
the coast to land area ratio where the negative point estimate is significant in several of
the regressions using only the settler subsample. From which we conclude that for those
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countries more coastline is somewhat inhibitive to logging.
Among the demand cofactors, the log of population density is always significant -
denser population is positively correlated with larger roundwood harvests. The ratio
of road length to land area is also significant, but only for the whole world results.
Though the point estimates are always positive, the ratio of roads is not significant when
considering the settler subsample.
Instrumental variables
The instrumental variables regression results for roundwood production are presented in
Table 3.5. As with previous tables, the results are separated into six numbered columns
- one for each regression specification. The first three columns utilize the log average
annual roundwood production for 1990 through 1999 as the dependent variable, and
the last three columns are for the 2000-2009 cross-section results. The table is split
between two panels where the top presents the two-stage least squares results, and the
bottom contains the first stage results. Upon examination of the first stage results there
is some indication that the settler mortality instrument may be a little weak regarding
its influence on political stability.
The difference between the OLS and IV point estimates is quite pronounced. Consid-
ering the difference when each regressor of interest is entered separately for each decade,
the point estimates for security and stability are between 4 and 6 times larger than the
OLS results would imply. This suggests that the arguably causal effect of these factors
is masked by endogenous factors mentioned previously. Other factors being equal, a one
standard deviation increase in investment security would increase roundwood production
by a factor of around 5 to 8. The point estimates for political stability suggest a larger
effect, a one standard deviation change causing change in production by a factor of 10 to
19. An increase of this level would be comparable to a shift from the political stability
and roundwood production observed in a country like Mali, Mozambique, or Vietnam to
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that of a country like New Zealand, Norway, or Sweden.
When both security and stability are included in the IV regressions neither variable
is significant, as seen in columns (3) and (6). The point estimates are smaller and the
standard errors are a little larger, political stability is particularly affected in this way.
In this case a one standard deviation change in investment security would imply only
a 2 to 4 factor change in output. Since both measures often covary it is instructive to
note the the sum of the security and stability point estimates in columns (3) and (6) is
about the same in magnitude as the point estimates when each measure is included singly
in columns (1), (2), (4), and (5). Also, the two measures are jointly significant at the
better than 1% level for both cross-sections. There may not be enough variation between
the two measures to parse out the partial effects of each with respect to roundwood
production. However, these joint results must be viewed with some caution since they
rely on employing early institution variables as instruments and these may not be as
exogenous as settler mortality. Embedded within these early institutions may be laws
and practices that continue to be enforced or strongly influence current logging practices.
As in the OLS set of results the environmental and demand cofactors remain, for the
most part, jointly significant. The joint significance of the environmental variables seems
to be driven largely by the initial area of forest cover as it was in the OLS regressions. A
larger initial endowment of forest area is correlated with larger average annual roundwood
output. Similarly, the coast line to land area ratio point estimate is always negative and
often, but not always, statistically significant - for a given land area, a more undulating
coastline is associated with lower roundwood harvest. Regarding the demand cofactors,
the roads to land area ratio does not play a measurable role, the sign on the point estimate
is not consistent and it is never significant. However, population density is almost always
significant and always has the expected positive sign.
I test the robustness of the roundwood IV results by removing specific observations
and by adding in additional controls for continent dummies, colonial origins, religion,
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climate, and natural resource abundance. I also swap out the settler mortality instrument
and use log years of schooling in 1960 in its place. When the neo-European countries
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States are dropped the results do not
change except for the effect of political stability in the 2000 decade cross section. The
standard error in column (5) for political stability doubles when those 4 countries are
excluded. Dropping the two possible outliers in the settler mortality data, Mali and
The Gambia, does not affect the statistical inference. However, the point estimates are
attenuated by 30% with a similar reduction in the standard errors.
Adding in continent indicators for Africa and Asia complicates the models. When
those dummies are included, investment security and political stability are no longer
significant. However, the continent dummies are not significant individually or jointly in
the second stage. Their inclusion in the first stage seems to affect the inference of the
regressors of interest since removing them from the first stage and including them only
in the second stage restores the results as presented in Table 3.5. It could be that the
investment security and political stability measures are picking up a continental effect
correlated with roundwood production.
Likewise the results do not seem so robust when climate controls are included. Al-
though humidity variables do not affect the baseline inference, different combinations of
temperature controls do and do not affect the statistical significance of the security and
stability variables. The climate variables have no individual or joint significance in the
first or second stage, yet they affect the regressions such that the standard errors are
larger when compared to the baseline results. Given the idiosyncrasy of these results
they are difficult to interpret. There may be some unknown avenue through which the
security and stability measures are picking up an effect on roundwood production related
to temperature.
Including Catholic and Muslim population density in the IV models does not ap-
preciably alter the results presented in Table 3.5. And although including dummies for
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British and French colonies, and French legal origin attenuates the point estimates by
20-30%, the standard errors also drop - the inference remains unchanged. When adding
in the set of natural resource abundance factors the significance for political stability on
column (5) is impacted by a larger standard error. The other results are not affected. It
is interesting to note that percent gold reserves is often significant in the second stage
of these regressions. Furthermore, the the joint combination of the gold, iron, oil, silver,
and zinc abundance are significantly different from zero in each model. Whether the
percentage of the worlds natural reserves in a given country affects its roundwood pro-
duction directly or through some other channel is not known, and could be an interesting
line of future research.
Utilizing log years of schooling in 1960 in place of the settler mortality instrument
results in little change for the point estimates for investment security and political sta-
bility in columns (1) and (2). In columns (4) and (5) the point estimates are about half
than when settler mortality is used. However, stability and security remain statistically
significant at the 5% level or better in each regression.
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3.5 Discussion
There are many reasons to question whether variation in political security and invest-
ment security are causal agents of forest cover change and roundwood production. I take
the approach that these measures are indicative of the social and institutional environ-
ment that influence the provision and enforcement of property rights, and as such are
only proxies. Whether the two factors I use as regressors in this paper are functionally
causal remains to be determined. At face value security and stability appear to benignly
influence forest cover change and timber production as evidenced by the strength of the
instrumental variables results. Comparing the IV to the OLS results, we observe that
for all sets of dependent variables the IV point estimates are larger and statistically sig-
nificant, where oft-times the OLS results using the same subsample are not. The fact
there are substantial differences is not surprising. This outcome generally falls in line
with the previous discussion above and in other papers that indicate correlations may be
inaccurate assessments of the potentially causal influences of institutional robustness on
forestland use.
The fact that differences between the OLS relationship and the causal influence are
expected, and that they are realized in a particular set of IV estimates is not sufficient
to pronounce the IV estimates as authoritative. The effectiveness of the instrument or
instruments to uncover causal evidence depends on whether or not they are actually
exogenous from the primary system, and valid in influencing the endogenous regressor.
I argue that the settler mortality instrument used by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
(2001) in identifying the influence institutions play in the differences of GDP between
countries can also be used to identify the influence institutions play in forestland use.
This assertion generally holds up to a number of robustness checks, such as the removal
of potential outliers, the inclusion of colonial origin and basis of law, religious density
of difference types, natural resource abundance, and climate. But there is not complete
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unanimity in this regard - the results for political stability vary, and the results when
climate variables are included are not particularly robust.
There is a substantial amount of variability in the point estimates for political stability
among the regression results. Whereas political stability is significant in each set of
baseline IV results where it is entered by itself, it is never significant when investment
security is included. Furthermore, the point estimates for stability in the IV models is
substantially lower than when it is entered singly, and in two cases the sign is negative.
We see similar variation in the results when robustness measures are applied. In the
1990s decade cross-section of forest area change, the significance of political stability is
affected by including continent dummies and climate controls. In the 2000’s decade cross-
section it is affected by dropping the four neo-Europe countries, dropping countries with
0 forest cover change, adding climate controls, and including natural resource abundance
variables. Similar patterns exist in the two roundwood production cross-sections when
using political stability.
The reasons why the political stability measure does not hold up well in the regressions
are the subject of speculation at this stage. It may be the case that political stability
is correlated with other influences and is simply a proxy when those other influences
are not included in the regression. Perhaps the political stability data I use may not
be representative or internally consistent to a sufficient degree. The political stability
variable is constructed by the World Bank as one of six measures that constitute their
World Governance Indicators dataset. It is the distillation of almost 20 factors to measure
the “perceptions of the likelihood of political instability”; it may be the subjective nature
of this variable that is the cause of its lack of robustness. It could be that ‘political
stability’, as a concept, is fundamentally nebulous and means different things in different
contexts. A single measure of such may not have much identifiable impact.
When climate controls are included in the IV regressions the results are substantially
different from the baseline IV results. The point estimates are halved and only the effect
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of investment security on forest area change remains significant. None of the regressors
of interest in the roundwood production IV models are significant. However, since the
climate variables are not jointly significant in any model in either the first or second stage,
the reasons for this lack of robustness is not clear. Parsing out the constituent climate
measures in iterative IV models reveals that different combinations of the temperature
variables affect the outcome, while humidity does not. This outcome is the same if settler
mortality is replaced with years of schooling in 1960 as the instrument. There may be
some unknown mechanism through which temperature interacts with forestland use. An
alternative way of assessing this is to utilize a different measure of institutional robustness.
When a measure of corruption is used in place of investment security or political stability
in IV models that include temperature, the point estimate has an expected negative sign
and is significant at the 5% level or better.
3.6 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to estimate what might be causal effects of institutional
robustness, through the measures of investment security and political stability, on forest
cover change and roundwood production. Using settler mortality as an arguably exoge-
nous source of variation in the current heterogeneity of political institutions currently
observed among countries, it appears that institutions play a particularly strong role
in whether forest cover expands or recedes. Although countries with stronger security
and stability tend to have higher rates of afforestation, the hypothesized endogeneity
occludes the estimated quasi-experimental effect which is 2 to 4 times larger than OLS
estimates would suggest. The IV estimates imply that a one standard deviation change
in investment security results in a 9 to 11% change in forest area over ten years. While
a one standard deviation change in political stability would result in a 12 to 15% change
in forest area over the same time period. A one standard deviation change would be akin
127
to shift in investment security at the current levels of Bolivia, Botswana, or Costa Rica,
to that of Ireland, Finland, or Canada.24 25
Using the same approach, I find institutional strength also influences average round-
wood production at the national level. The IV results indicate casual effects larger than
those which simple correlations imply. A one standard deviation change in investment
security would increase roundwood production by a factor of 5 to 8, ceteris paribus; while
the simple correlation between the two indicates that this difference is only associated
with a 40 to 50% difference in production. For political stability the effect seems to be
greater – a one standard deviation increase would yield an expansion in production of 10
to 19 times. Based on this result political stability would appear to exert a larger influ-
ence on roundwood production than investment security, though joint regression results
are not able to confirm this.
While these results seem to indicate a causal effect of institutional quality on forest-
land use they are not uniformly robust. As such further investigation is warranted. The
investment security measure tends to hold up better to the removal of potential outliers,
and to the inclusion of additional control variables which others have observed may be
correlated with development and institutions. The IV models are generally robust to
replacing settler mortality with the log of years of school in 1960, as used by Glaeser
et al. (2004).
The two measures I use should be considered proxies for the social and political cli-
mate of institutions, and as such do not specify how a given country may increase its
forest area or roundwood production by strengthening those factors. This fact is a short
coming in this analysis – it is not prescriptive of policies that might influence benign
24Since the investment security index constructed by Bohn and Deacon (2000) is lucid, a governmental
change from a monarchy to a non-parliamentary democracy, military dictatorship, or strong executive
regime would be sufficient in most cases to cause a one standard deviation change. A change from one
of the previous three regimes to a parliamentary democracy would also be sufficient.
25An investment stability induced 12% change in forest area for Bolivia, Botswana, and Costa Rica
would increase forest area by around 8.5 million hectares, potentially sequestering a little over 1 gigatonne
of carbon in above-ground vegetation. Estimates calculated using data from Dixon et al. (1994).
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forestland use outcomes. It may be the case that there are no exogenous institutional
treatments that a given country might apply to realize increases in forest extent and
timber production. However, the results are not purely academic either. The effective-
ness of international programs to reduce deforestation and forest degradation might be
increased when consideration of security and stability is applied. Certainly, if nothing
else this research highlights that, despite the large body of literature on deforestation,
there are still avenues of future research which can illuminate causal effects of processes
that policies might target and influence.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: Relationship between forest area change, political stability, and investment security.
Note: Political stability and investment security expressed as z-scores. Each point is a country-
level observation.
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Figure 3.2: Relationship between industrial roundwood production, political stability, and
investment security.
Note: Political stability and investment security expressed as z-scores. Each point is a country-
level observation.
137
Figure 3.3: First-stage relationship between political stability, and investment security, with
settler mortality.
Note: Political stability and investment security expressed as z-scores. Each point is a country-
level observation.
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Appendix
Data descriptions and sources
Coastline - Length of coastline, including islands. From CIA (2000).
Colonial origins - Colony of Belgian, British, Dutch, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, or Spanish
origins, categorical values. From La Porta et al. (1999).
Constraint on executive - Categorical data on the level of constraint faced by the government exec-
utive in the first year of national independence. From Jaggers and Gurr (1996).
Corruption 2005 - Corruption perceptions index as reported by Transparency International.
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2005, accessed 26 May 2015.
CPI-U 1990-2009 - U.S. consumer price index, all urban consumers, city average, all items. From
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Democracy variables - Categorical data on the level of democracy in the first year of independence
and in 1900. Categories comprised of measures for the competitiveness of political participation and
government executive recruitment, and executive constraints. From Jaggers and Gurr (1996).
European settler mortality - Deaths per 1000 settlers as inferred and/or described on records of
settler and soldier deaths. See Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2000) Appendix B for detailed infor-
mation. From Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001).
Forest area 1990, 2000, 2010 - Forested area (natural or plantation), does not include other wooded
land or tree stands in agricultural production. From FAO CountrySTAT (FAO, 2010).
French legal origin - Indicator for whether the country’s legal system originated from French Company
Law or Commercial code. From La Porta et al. (1999)
Fresh water resources 2002 - Renewable internal freshwater from river-flows and groundwater from
rainfall. From The World Bank (2015).
GDP per capita 1990-2009 - Nominal gross domestic product per capita (U.S. Dollars). From The
World Bank (2015).
Humidity variables - Morning minimum, morning maximum, afternoon minimum, and afternoon
maximum, in percent. From Parker (1997)
Land area 2000 - Country total area, excluding inland water bodies, continental shelf claims, and
EEZs. From The World Bank (2015).
Natural resource abundance - Percent of world reserves for gold, iron, oil, silver, and zinc. From
Parker (1997).
Investment security index 1990-2006 - Index measures investment as a fraction of national output
attributed to political variables. From Bohn and Deacon (2000).
Political stability index 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002-2009 - Index measures the perceptions of the
likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated violence. Lower values indicate higher
perceived likelihood of instability. From The World Bank (2015).
Population density, 1990, 2000 - Population per square kilometer of land area. From The World
Bank (2015).
Religion compositions 1980 - Percent of population Catholic and Muslim. From La Porta et al.
(1999).
Roads - Length of paved and unpaved roads, and highways. From CIA (2000).
Roundwood production 1990-2009 - Annual industrial roundwood production volume, includes
sawlogs, veneer logs, and other industrial roundwood. From FAOSTAT.
Schooling - Log years of schooling of the total population over 25 years of age in 1960. From Barro
and Lee (2001).
Temperature variables - Average temperature, minimum monthly high, maximum monthly high,
minimum monthly low, and maximum monthly low, in centigrade. From Parker (1997).
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Forestland use and GDP
Gross domestic product may or may not be an important covariate in regressions involving
forest cover change and industrial roundwood production. Many question whether GDP
is a driver of environmental quality, vis-a-vis an environmental Kuznets curve, with
respect to deforestation. This paper takes the approach used in Deacon (1994, 1999);
Bohn and Deacon (2000) and does not directly include GDP as a regressor. If GDP is
used in regressions it may be endogenous to the process of deforestation and roundwood
production, and if so, it is likely to be triangular in relationship to the instruments I
employ and the regressors of interest. For these reasons the OLS and IV results discussed
below should be viewed with a skeptical eye. In the results below I only consider GDP
with respect to forest cover change.
When GDP26 is included in the OLS regressions for forest cover change using only the
settler subsample, and where I use only a single regressor of interest (either investment
security or political stability), the regressors of interest remain significant at the 10% level
or better. In these results GDP itself is significant only in the models where investment
security is used. Investment security is significant in regressions using the whole world
with GDP, but political stability is not.
Considering GDP may be endogenous I revisit the two-stage least squares regressions
and instrument for investment security and GDP, or political stability and GDP, using
settler mortality and early institution variables. Utilizing this approach only the invest-
ment security measure for the 1990s cross section of forest cover change is significant,
while GDP is not significant in any set of results. Swapping out the settler mortality for
years of schooling in 1960 as the instrument, results in the statistical significance of the
investment security measure in both decade cross sections, but political stability remains
non significant. Here again, GDP is also not significant in any set of results.
26GDP for the two decade cross-sections is formulated from annual nominal GDP per capita inflated
by the U.S. CPI-U and averaged for each decade.
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